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April 17, 1981 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 80-1417 
OKIN et al. (physicians] 
v. 
ROGERS et al. [patients] 
1. SUMMARY: The 
Cert to CAl (Coffin, 
Campbell, Davis [CtCl]) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
basic question is whether 
involuntarily committed mental patients have a right to refuse ...---_ 
antipsychotic drugs that their doctors want to administer. 





physicians at those hospitals, routinely administer 
antipsychotic prugs such as thorazine and mellaril. Those 
drugs have been shown to alleviate some psychoses, especially 
schizophrenia, but the¥ also have dangerous potential side 
effects. 
7 
Resps, contending in essence that they have a 
constitutional right to . refuse treatment, sued for an 
injunction to restrict the circumstances under which the 
hospita~ can forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs. 
The proceedings are somewhat tangled. After a trial, 
the district court granted an injunction that the CA left 
largely intact. The reasoning of the CA, insofar as pertinent 
here, is as follows. The court noted at the outset that it is 
"intuitively obvious," and not disputed by the parties, that 
due I m._:ntal ,g~t i_;nts have ., a themselves whether to submit process right to medical to decide for treatment. The 
question, therefore, is whether the state's interests in the 
forcible administration of drugs override the individual's 
protected interest. The CA found two sources of legitimate 
state authority: the police power and the parens patriae 
power. 
Under the police power, all parties agree that the 
state can forcibly administer drugs if necessary to protect the 
patient, other patients, or hospital staff from harm. The 
' 
controversy centers around the likelihood of ~arm neceg sary to _____ ....._, .. ._.--... ~ -:a 
' 
justify forced medication. The district court had held that 
forced medication could be performed only if, without 
.... 
3. 
medication, it is "more likely than not" that the patient or 
others would be harmed. The CA foun his standard too strict. 
It noted that prediction of violence often cannot be reduced to 
such probabilities, and the state should not be impaired in its 
effort to protect its citizens because of medical uncertainty. 
Yet, the CA also noted that forced medication should not be 
used unless, in light of all the facts and circumstances, it 
was necessary. Weighing these conflicting interests, the CA 
held: 
The court should leave this difficult, 
necessarily ad hoc balancing to state 
physicians and limit its own role to 
designing procedures for ensuring that the 
patients' interests in refusing 
antipsychotics are taken into consideration 
and that antipsychotics are not 
administered absent a finding by a 
qualified physician that those interests 
are outweighed and less restrictive 
alternatives are unavailable. 
The precise nature of the necessary procedures was left to be 
determined by "creative" work by the district court on remand. 
Under the parens patriae power, theCA noted that the 
state may act as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, 
and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 u.s. 251, 257 
(1972}, quoting \"7. Blackstone, Commentaries 47. The parens 
patriae power permits the state to "go beyond the mere 
protection of the mentally ill from harm to the forcible 
administration of treatment tnought curative." Antipsychotic 
drugs have been shown to be use~ul in treatment, and thus may 




state only can act under this power when the individual himself 
is incapable of making . a competent decision concerning 
treatment~ in other words, the sine qua non of the state's 
power is the individual's lack of capacity. The state concedes 
that some individuals who are involuntarily committed 
nevertheless are capable of making competent decisions with 
respect to treatment. The CA reasoned, therefore, that drugs 
may not be involuntarily administered without a judicial 
determination, with respect to each patient, that he lacks the 
capacity to decide whether to undergo that form of treatment. 
According to the CA, the original commitment hearing itself is 
not sufficient. Under Massachusetts law, a person may be 
committed upon a showing of risk of harm to himself or others. 
It is not necessary to show that the person is incapable of 
making decisions concerning his treatment, and it does not 
follow that all those who present risks of harm are incapable 
of deciding whether or not to accept treatment. The CA did not 
specify the minimum procedural standards that such a judicial 
determination must observe. It did, however, note that the 
probate guardianship procedures would be constitutionally 
adequate. The CA did acknowledge two exceptions to the general 
constitutional requirement of pretreatment competency hearings. 
First, no formal hearing with full trappings is necessary if 
immediate action is necessary to prevent deterioration of the 
patient's psychiatric condition . . Under those circumstances, 
some lesser protections would be constitutionally adequate. 
,. .h.I.J,.,._ • • .,.,. , 
c 
50 
The CA noted that, upon remand, the district court could 
develop alternative procedures suitable for expedited emergency 
competency determinations. 
more in the nature of 
The CA's second exception really is 
a clarification. Under it, once 
incompetency has been established and a guardian appointed, the 
doctors canst i tut ionally need not consult with the guard ian 
before each episode of involuntary medication. However, the 
doctors constitutionally must act "with the aim of making 
treatment decisions as the individual himself would were he 
competent to do so." Toward this end, there perhaps should be 
"some mechanism for periodic review by non-treating physicians" 
to "ensure that the treating physicians are in fact attempting 
to make treatment decisions as the patients themselves would 
were they competent." The CA left open precisely what 
procedures of this sort were constitutionally required. The 
court instructed the district court to develop these on remand. 
In conclusion, the CA asked the district court on 
remand to "explor[e] and evaluat[e]" procedural safeguards 
necessary to fulfill the general constitutional requirements 
identifed above. 
The parties then returned to the district court to 
discuss the various issues open on remand. A dispute developed 
over the extent to which the CA had vacated the district 
court's original injunction. The district judge said the 
· injunction had been vacated onl¥ with respect to an issue not 
relevant here. Counsel for the state, however, thought that 
( 
6. 
the whole injunction had been vacated. The state petitioned 
the CA for clarificatiqn. The CA issued the following 
statement. 
We think it would be premature to attempt 
to review the district court's intentions 
under our recent opinion where so little 
time has passed and where no definitive 
steps have yet been taken. The district 
court has indicated an intention to move 
expeditiously. Its decrees, when they 
emerge, will, of course, be subject to 
appellate review in the ordinary course. 
The state now petitions for certiorari. Although, as 
noted, proceedings have occurred in the district court after 
remand, the instant petition was timely filed here, counting 
from the date of the original CA decision. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs at the outset dispute the 
CA's premise. It is not "intuitively obvious"--and petrs 
definitely do not concede--that a committed mental patient has 
a constitutionally protected interest in being left free to 
refuse antipsychotic medication. By definition, an 
institutionalized person does not enjoy the privacy of a person 
in his own horne; what would be a private decision for a person 
at horne becomes the state's decision because an 
institutionalized person's interests are "inexplicably [sic] 
intertwined with the interests of the state and other 
patients." Nothing in Roe v. Wade or other "privacy" cases 
suggests the result that the CA reached. 
Because there is no "fundamental right to privacy" at 
issue in this case, the CA should only have looked to see 
. .. .. -- ... _.,.._._.,.,.. . 
7. 
whether the state's methods bore a reasonable and substantial 
relation to legitimate state objectives. Instead, the CA 
demanded that the state treat patients in the "least 
restrictive manner." This is an inappropriate level of 
scrutiny. It is clear that many patients require antipsychotic 
medication, whether for their own benefit or for the protection 
of others. The CA has demanded individualized determinations, 
but the fit between the means and ends does not have to be 
precise in this context. 
In any event, an adjudication of civil commitment 
ought to suffice to permit the state to take what it believes 
to be necessary medical procedures. That threshold finding 
gives the state substantial powers. It is unreasonable to 
require a day-to-day judicial declaration of incompetency to 
make decisions relevant to treatment. As a 
Developments piece stated: 
Inherent in an adjudication that an 
individual should be · committed under the 
state's · pare~s patria~ power is the 
decisiorr that he can be forced to accept 
the trea"tments f<Jund to · be in his best 
/
interest; " it would be incongruous if an 
individual who lacks the capacity to make a 
treatment decision could frustrate the very 
justification for tne state's action by 
refusing such treatments. 
Harvard 
Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 
8 7 Ha r v. L. Rev. 119 0 , 13 4 4 ( 19 7 4) • 
Even if the CA is right that a protected interest is 
at issue, the court defined too narrowly the emergencies under 
which the state may act alone . The CA acknowledged that the 
- 8. 
state could act to prevent imminent psychiatric deterioration. 
But it failed to recognize the need to prevent immediate severe 
suffering. 
Petrs say that it is important that the court grant 
cert now to resolve these questions. Since the injunction has 
been in effect, about 10-12 patients per day refuse their 
medication. An "atmosphere of violence" developed in the 
hospitals and it is difficult to attract and retain staff. 
Under the injunction, the number of patients who must be 
transferred to maximum security facilities has tripled. 
Finally, petr says there is a conflict with the 
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Price v. Sheppard, 
307 Minn. 250 (1976). That case held that if the state may 
civilly commit someone and thereby deprive him of his liberty, 
the §tate also may "assume the treatment decision." 
In opposition, resps concede that the question is 
important and that the Court will want to grant cert at some 
point. According to resps, however, review now would be 
premature for three reasons. First, the CA left open for 
decision on remand the specifics of the program that it thought 
the constitution required. Second, the case In re Guardianship 
of Richard Roe is pending in the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 
One of the issues in that case is whether incompetents like 
resps have a right to refuse treatment as a matter of state 
law. If they do, that would render it unnecessary to decide 
the constitutional question. Third, this Court should wait for 
..... ______ ~ 
9. 
more lower federal courts to rule on the question before 
venturing into the thicket. The asserted conflict with Price 
v. Sheppard, supra, does not exist. It is true that this case 
held that committed patients do not have the right to refuse 
treatment. But the court reached that decision essentially as 
a matter of state law. It found that, under Minnesota law, the 
very fact of commitment on the ground of mental illness amounts 
to an adjudication that the individual is unable rationally to 
make treatment decisions. 307 Minn. at 259 & n. 7. The CA' s 
decision in this case rested on a finding that involuntary 
commitments under Massachusetts law do not subsume an 
adjudication of incompetency to make treatment decisions. 
4.· DISCUSSION: The case is important, but resps 
reasons for denying cert are on target. (1) The CA in effect 
held that a protected interest was involved and that procedural 
protections were necessary before that interest could be 
subordinated to that of the st'ate. But the CA left to the 
district court on remand the task of identifying precisely the 
procedures that the constitution required. The CA told the 
district court to be "creative" in developing novel procedures 
to reconcile the rights of patients with the legitimate needs 
of the state. It is not known now exactly what the district 
court will order and whether the CA will affirm that order. 
The precise scope of the final order will determine the nature 
of the burden on the state. That burden is highly relevant to 





considerations--and perhaps the final judgment rule--counsel 
against reviewing this case before the scope of the ultimate 
procedural scheme is known. {2) It also is relevant that the 
pending state-law case could make it unnecessary to decide the 
constitutional question. {3) Finally, there is no real 
conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court case for the reason 
stated by resp. 
There is a reponse. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Dick Fallon 
DATE: December 14, 1981 
RE: No. 80-1417, Mills v. Rogers 
Question Presented 
This case presents the question whether patients committed 
to a State mental institution have a constitutional right to 




A. Posture of the Case 
When the Court granted this case, there was concern about 
its ripeness for review. The concern arose from the vagueness 
The court of appeals cast its opinion in the c._f/1 ) f of Cal's opinion. 
~m~st gener~- ter.!!s· It 
weighed, but ultimately 
articulates the considerations to be 
shrinks from weighing them. Having 
given some general guidance, it remands the case to the 
district court to formulate the standards under which drug 
therapy may and may not be administered to resisting patients. 
b)././ tiN 
~· 
The procedural posture of the case presents no 
jurisdictional barrier to review by this Court. Nonetheless, I 
believe that the Court should now DIG this case on the basis of 
an intervening decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial ~t"' 
Court, In r ; · ; e"; -;I;-, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
~ DJ In Roe III the Massachusetts court considered the right, 
~~t' of institutionalized patients, but of a 
"J)IG' 
/ 
noninstitutionalized mental incompetent, to resist drug 
treatment. Resting its decision i ointJ Y on Massachusetts and 
on federal law, the Court held that a guardian could not~~ 
------~ 
to drug therapy on behalf of his ward. 
~~ ,, 
A JUdicial hearing was ........ 
required. More generally, a crucial determination in the - -hearing concerned the ward's substituted judgment. The question 
was not limited to the ward's "best interests." On the 
contrary, the court "emphasize[d] that the determination is not 
what is medically in the ward's best interests 
~ 
The 
determination of what the incompetent individual would do if 
3. 
c<:mpet~t will probe the incompetent individual's values and 
preferences, and such an inquiry, in a case involving 
antipsychotic drugs, is best made in courts of competent 
jurisdiction." 421 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
:( ~ I should say at the outset that my recommendation may be 
0~ v.~ based on an excessively broad reading of Roe III. The 
hf~Dw-~ Massachusetts court said explicitly that it "decline [d] to rule 
~
• on the right of patients confined against their will to State 
pitals to refuse antipsychotic medication." 421 N.E.2d at 
~ ::.~diNn::et:;;;;se~ ~;~~s whaic:u:::r M::sa::::e::~::::: 
said were "not directed toward a single case but rather [to] 
identify the decisionmaking processes necessary to reach 
; 
~ outcomes in a type 
~ -both substantive 
of cases." Id. A number of those holdings-
and procedural--are inextricably connected 
~ with issues raised in this case. 
B. The Issues in This Case 
This case raises the general question whether mental 
patients have a constitutional right to refuse treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs. The question is one of general 
importance, which has arisen in a number of recent decisions by 
the federal district courts and by various state courts. 
Nonetheless, it is somewhat misleading to speak of a single 
"question." Most courts seem to have concluded that patients ____ .......... 
sometimes do have a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs but 
sometimes do not. 1 Their opinions have characteristically 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
l( ,, A'1h 
addressed at least .. t:o issl es. l!.!.v Under what circumstances 
may a mental institution ~rcibly impose unwanted treatment? 
~ What procedures are necessary to determine whether the 
requisite circumstances in fact exist in a particular case? In 
this case, CAl addressed both issues in terms of unusual 
generality. The problem raised by Roe III is that both issues 
may implicate questions of State law. And Roe III has very 
arguably changed the law of Massachusetts since the time that 
this case was decided. 
II. DECISIONS BELOW 
The case at bar originated in 1975, when seven patients at 
the Boston State Hospital invoked the jusrisdiction of the DC 
under 42 u.s.c. §1983. Alleging violation of their 
constitutional rights, they sought a TRO and ultimately a 
permanent injunction barring their involuntary seclusion or 
medication except where there was a serious threat of violence. 
Plaintiffs also sought relief in damages. The trial court 
quickly entered a TRO, which remained in effect until the 
issuance of a permanent injunction on October 29, 1979. Trial 
of the case began in December 1977. It ultimately included 72 
1see, ~, Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 
1978), F-:-20 (CA3 1981) (decision based on due process 
groundsT:sco~v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (CA3 1973) (decision on 
privacy and First Amendment bases); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 
877 (CA9 1973) (First and Eighth Amendments); Knecht v,. Gillman, 
488 F.2d 1136 (CAS 1973) (Eighth Amendment); Winters v. Miller, 
446 F.2d 65 (CA2 1971) (First-Amendment religious grounds). 
5. 
days of testimony. 
The lengthy opinion of the trial court (Tauro, J.) found -----
that the psychiatirsts at the hospital had acted in good faith, 
478 F. Supp. at 1382, and that their use of compulsory 
medication constituted "reasonable medical practice." Id. at 
1386. Most patients had "showed eventual improvement." Ibid. 
But the court also found that the patients had a constitutional 
right of privacy, and that forcible medication infringed on ,.__ ___ 
~his right. It elaborated on this analysis by holding that the 
right of privacy "embodies First Amendment concerns," ? id. at .. 
1366, to which forced medication constituted an affront. It 
impinged on the commtted patient's "right to produce a thought-
-or refuse to do so .•.. " Id. at 1367. The court also stressed 
that even a committed patient was presumed to be "competent" 
under Massachusetts law. Id. at 1366. Accordingly, the court 
ruled that an objecting patient could be medicated onl under 
one of two conditions: 
1. Drugs could be administered in an ~ergency situation.r~ 
____;::__.;--
This was defined as a situation in which it was "more likely 
than not," see 478 F. Supp. at 1364-1365, that a failure to 
administer medication "would result in physical harm to 
that patient, other patients, or to staff members of the 
institution." Id. at 1365. 
2. In non-emergency situations, drugs could be 
administered only after a atient had been ~1djudged incom etent ~'G) 
at a judicial hearing, and a court-appointed guardian had 
consented on his behalf. 
6. 
On cross-appeal, the First Circuit a_f_i_r_m_e_d ___ i_n~ part, CA 1 
reversed in part, vacated, and remanded. 
In a structurally complex and even confusing opinion, 
Judge Coffin reasoned that the case called for a balancing the 
individual's right to privacy against the state's interests in 
administering medication. The characterization of the 
individual's interest in avoiding medication was more intuitive 
thaf analytical: "We beg in our....-analysis with what seems to us . .......____ 
to be an intuitively ob~ious proposition: a person has a 
constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the 
state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious 
and potentially harmfu~ medical treatment that is represented 
by the administration of antipsyhotic drugs." 634 F.2d at 653. 
Against the personal interest in privacy, the court 
balanced two State interests. First there was a police power 
interest in "protecting persons from physical harm at the hands 
of the mentally ill." Like the DC, CAl held this interest 
sufficient to justify forcible medication of patients in order 
to prevent violence. But it rejected the DC' s test for the 
triggering of this interest, involving a "unitary standard of 
quantitative likelihood" of violence, and instead required "an 
individualized estimation of the possibility and type of 
violence, the likely effects of particular drugs on a 
particular individual, and an appraisal of alternative, less-
restrictive courses of actions." 
This is one of CAl's most crucial holdings. But Judge 
Coffin left entirely unclear what it means. He said, inter 
-----------------------~---~--------------




alia, that: "Instead of second-guessing defendants, the court 
should have taken as true their asserted difficulties in 
applying" a more-likely-than-not standard~ that "the array of 
relevant factors" causes any professional judgment almost to 
defy reviewability~ that on remand the DC should consider 
imposing a requirement that institutions "rule out" all 
"reasonable alternatives" and less intrusive means before 
administering antipsychotic drugs~ that due process required 
individualized judgments before drugs could be involuntarily 
administered~ and that the DC should design the procedures 
under which psychiatrists would be permitted to make the 
required individual judgments about the necessity of drug 
treatment. But Judge Coffin did not suggest with any precision 
how the individual interests should be weighed, and he left 
development of the requisite procedures entirely for the 
district court. 
At the conclusion of his discussion of the state's police 
powers, Judge Coffin turned to a second State interest in 
administering antipsychotic drugs--this the state's parens 
patriae interest in acting, on behalf of the incompetent 
patient, to seek a cure for the patient's mental illness. The 
court quoted at length from a Developments in the Law--Civil 
Cornrni tment of the Mentally Ill article in 87 Harvard L. Rev. 
(1974) at 1344: "Inherent in the adjudication that an 
individual should be committed under the state's parens patriae 
power is the decision that he can be forced to accept the 






incongruous if an individual who lacks the capacity to make a 
treatment decision could frustrate the very justification for 
the s tate's ation by refusing such treatment." 
Having said this, however, the court--like the DC--turned 
to the Massachusetts statutes. These established a distinction 
between the standards for institutionalization (including a 
requirement that a person must be adjudicated to be mentally 
ill) and the standards for judging a person "incompetent." 
Finding a distinction between the two, it held that "Nothing in 
the statutory scheme suggests that a finding of mental 
illness is equivalent to a finding that the individual is 
incapable of deciding for himself whether commitment and 
treatment are in his own best interest." The commmitment 
decision was therefore "an inadequate predicate to the forcible 
administration of drugs to an individual where the purported 
justification for that action is the state's parens patriae 
power." 
However, consistent with its emphasis on the State's 
parens patriae status, CAl plainly rejected the DC' s 
requirement that a guardian must approve non-emergency 
medication of an objecting mental patient. Again, however, the 
court's precise holding is not free from ambiguity. As I read 
its opinion, the court, inter alia, stated that: there must 
ordinarily be an "adjudication" of the patient's incompetency, 
but that this need not be--at least as a matter of 
constitutional law--a "fullblown probate proceeding" as 
provided under current Massachusetts statutes: that this 
I f 
9. 
"adjudication" requirement was subject to an exception for 
cases in which any delay could result in "significant 
deterioration of the patient's mental health"; that, following 
a determination of incompetency, "state actions based on parens 
patriae interests must be taken with the aim of making 
treatment decisions as the individual himself would were he 
competent to do so"; and that some minimal procedures must be 
developed to insure compliance with this requirement. Again, 
however, CAl did not specify the procedures required; it did 
not attempt to give constitutional content to the concept of 
"competency"; and it did not define the constitutional 
requirements for a fair competency hearing, saying on this 
point only that the Massachusetts probate statutes exceeded the 
minimum by so much that the legislature might want to consider 
their revision. 
Jt 
CAl held that voluntary patients enjoy '' Additionally, no 
special rights as a matter of constitutional law. They may be 
required to accept the treatment prescribed or to leave the 
hospital. If they choose to leave, they may be converted to 
involuntary status. If so, they would enjoy precisely the 
rights of other involuntary patients. Finally, CAl upheld the 
DC in denying relief on the claim for damages. 
III. ARGUMENTS AND CONCERNS OF THE PARTIES 
A. Anti-Psychotic Drugs 
Because both parties devote significant portions of their 
briefs to a discussion of antipsychotice drugs, it may aid 
analysis to lay out their differences at ....________.__ the outset. Not 
3~,·-~,-~ 
/ 12-t ~ ~~:.,o 
/ 'V-(1--~ ~~..4-~ 
diff fundamentally about ~the ~ 
~~ 
surprisingly, the parties 
effects and the effectiveness f anti-psychotic drugs. In the 
view of 
decision to refuse them an aspect of treatment constitutes 
prima facie evidence of mental incompetence. To respondents, 
the drugs are of uncer ain effectiveness and possess alarming 




psychiatry in the 




sometimes called "major 
were introduced into 
It is estimated that up to 250 
them since that time. Although 
they differ structurally, anti-psychotiuc drugs produce a 
common set of neurological effects. In crude terms, the drugs 
influence chemical transmissions to the brain, affecting both 
activatory and inhibitory functions. For unknown reasons, their 
predominant detectable effect is to reduce the level of various 
psychotic symptoms, including delusions and impulses to 
violence. Respondents mount a mild challenge to the 
effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in achieving even this 
short-term medical goal of symptomatic relief. But the 
'-------.. 
literature seems generally to support their use; and, in any --
case, as to this point the professional judgment of the 
petitioner doctors should almost certainly be respected. 
~ Respondents' more troubling challenge involves two 
~~ principal arguments. First, there is no doubt that the drugs 
·~ ,. are "mind-altering." They change the way that a patient thinks 
- ··"' 
and views the world. Indeed, this is what makes them 
successful. But there is a powerful argument that the First 
{ Amendment1lr ight of free 
( conceptual logic--a right of free thought. 
encompasses--as a matter of 
(How could anyone 
express himself freely if he were not given freedom to 
formululate the thoughts he later expressed?) If so, anti-
psychotic drugs impinge on this freedom in a way different from 
traditional psychotherapy. By its very nature, psychotherapy 
cannot succeed without the cooperation of the patient. Organic 
therapy operates independently of the patient's wishes. It is 
therefore "coercive" in a different and arguably more 
objectionable way. 
Second, antipsychotic drugs can have a variety of alarming 
side-effects, including four necrological syndromes: 
1. Parkinsonisms, characterized by mask-like face, 
rertarded volitional movements, and tremors; 
2. Akathasis, the clinical name for restlessness or a 
general inability to stay still; 
3. Dystonic reactions, including grimacing and other 
muscle spasms; and 
4. Tardive dyskinesia, characterized by involuntary muscle 
movements, especially around the mouth. Unlike the other three 
syndromes, tardive dyskinesia persists long after the drugs 
have been taken, and it is often resistant to treatment. There 
seems to be a real debate about the prevalence of tardive 
dyskinesia. Some studies have found its symptoms among over 
50% of all chronically hospitalized schizonphrenics and among 
?-e.~~ ~4-v ~s 
~~~~~ 12. 
/ 
/ over 40% of schizophrenic outpatients who have been treated 
-, 
with antipsychotic drugs. Other studies have generated more 
optimistic results. 
B. Arguments of Petitioners and Amici 
In arguing that CAl unduly limited their capacity to 
administer drugs, petitioners stress two main arguments. First 
they emphasize the nexus between commitment and mental illness. 
The justification for commitment is that the patient is 
incompetent to manage his life and therefore needs to be cured 
or rehabilitated. Second, they emphasize that the decision to 
administer drugs lies within the professional expertise of the 
institutional psychiatrist. Their professional judgments 
require expert knowledge of two kinds of factors beyond the 
competence of the courts. One involves the therapeutic value 
of various modes of treatment. The other concerns the 
institutional dynamics of a mental hospital, with all its 
potential for physical violence--and, what may be nearly as 
significant, for the disruption of carefully planned courses of 
therapy for unstable individuals. 
According to petitioners, the fundamental mistake of the ---· lower courts lay in their focus on "competency" under 
Massachusetts law. A patient cannot be committed unless his 
condition has been found to (1) create a likelihood of serious 
harm and (2) to constitute a mental illness. Mass. Gen. Laws, 
c. 123, §8. This finding must be made beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Superintendant of Worcester State Hospital v. Hagberg, 
374 Mass. 271 (1978). The finding of mental illness, ample to 
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justify taking away someone's freedom, justifies the State as 
parens patriae in making decisions on the patient's behalf. It 
cannot be otherwise if the patient is to be cured. Ambivalence 
about treatment is a classic symptom of mental illness. The 
lower courts attempted to rely on "incompetency" as the 
predicate for the State's acting parens patriae. But this is 
unworkable. Competency varies day-by-day, even while mental 
illness--which requires constancy of treatment--remains 
unaltered. This fact of "illness" demonstrates the fallacy of 
holding that psychotic thought and speech somehow merit First 
Amendment protection. 
Petitioners argue at length that antipsychotic drugs are 
therapeutically effective, and that long-term side-effects can 
usually be controlled. They assert that "failure to medicate a 
psychotic patient early in his illness invites chronicity." 
Brief at 61. These drugs are responsible for the reduction in 
patient populations. The lower courts assumed the availability 
of alternative yet effective treatments; this is a dream, 
sustained by only a relative hand full of experienced 
institutional psychiatrists. 
~I p "~ As to process sa feg uar d s , those followed by the hospital 
~1/ were more than ample. Patients' m~dications were regularly 
~ reviewed by the entire staff, functioning in regular collective 
meetings, in teams, and in individual rounds. Due process is a 
flexible concept, amenable to situations. In the context the 
process provided by the hospital is sufficient. Involving 
either the judiciary or a guardian imposes burdens that neither 
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is prepared to meet~ it is also bad for the patient, because it 
fosters the notion that his interests somehow diverge from 
those of the doctors treating him. 
Finally, with regard to Roe III, the petitioner make two 
arguments. First, the court's references to the "common law" 
are ambiguous. The decision rests on the federal constitution 
and its conclusions are not binding on this Court. Second, Roe 
III is not on point. The court was careful to limit its 
holding to the peculiar context of that case, involving a 
noninstitutionalized patient. 1 
~I-rs / ' 
Briefs in support of the re~~nts' position 
filed by the~erican Psychiatric Association (APA) 
have been 
and the 
vAmerican College of Neuropsycopharmacology (ACN). The APA 
urges that the decision to commit should not be unhinged from ---------------the decision to treat. If it is unconstitutional to treat a 
/
patient, it is irrational to confine him in a hospital. The 
~akes similar arguments, but offers one unique suggestion. 
Conceding arguendo that there is a limited constitutional right 
to refuse treatment, it suggests that due process would be 
satisfied by the establishment of a hospital review board to 
hear patient complaints. Judicial process should not be 
invoked, however, and there should be no post-commitment 
requirement of "competency" hearings. 
C. Arguments of Respondents and Amici 
Respondents begin from the proposition that the forced 
administration of antipsychotic drugs impinges on three 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Constitution. 
., 
15. 
First, compulsory treatment encroaches on a person's interest 
in bodily integrity. Second, it denies a patient his right to 
make independent decisions on his own behalf. Third, forced 
administration of drugs invades the interest in private 
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings. Because of these interests, a 
number of lower courts have held that mental patients at least 
sometimes have a right to refuse psychiatric treatment. See 
Brief at 43-44 (citing cases). These interests have received 
traditional common law protection in the doctrine of informed 
consent. See 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 61 (1968 
Supp.). 
In addition to the liberty interests arising from the 
Constitution and the common law tradition, the State of 
Massachusetts has created liberty interests entitled to respect 
under the due process clause. In its recent decision in In the 
Matter of the Guardianship of Richard Roe III, 421 N.E.2d 40, 
51-52 (1981), the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that all 
persons in Massachusetts--incompetent as well as competent--
have a fundamental right to refuse treatment in the absence of 
"an overwhelming state interest." 
In the absence of an emergency, the State has no right to 
impose drug treatment on persons not adjudged to be legally 
incompetent. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
found, as a matter of Massachusetts law, that a committed 
patient may not be deemed, without more, to be incapable of 
making treatment decisions. In Roe III, supra, 421 N.E.2d at 
55, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently affirmed that, as 
16. 
a matter of Massachusetts law, the "commitment decision itself 
is an inadequate predicate to the forcible administration of 
drugs to an individual where the purported justification for 
that action is the State's parens patriae power." Id., at 55 & 
n.l5. 
The petitioners assume that the fact of commitment will 
itself suffice to justify the imposition of drug therapy. But 
the individual himself must be incapable of making a competent 
decision on his own. Otherwise the very justification for the 
state's purported exercise of its parens patriae powers--its 
citizens' inability to care for themselves--would be missing. 
Here the dist ct found this predicate to be absent: "The weight 
of evidence persuades this court that, although committed 
mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their 
relationship to reality, most are able to appreciate the 
benefits, risks and discomfort that may reasonably be expected 
I' 
from receiving psychotripic medication. This is particularly 
true for patients who have experienced such medication and, 
therefore, have some basis for assessing comparative advantages 
and disadvantages." 4 7 8 F • S u pp • , at 13 61 . To assume such 
patients to be incompetent, without further adjudication, would 
be to deny them due process of law. 
Even if Massachusetts law did not require a competency 
determination prior to forced treatment, this is required by 
~
the Due Process Clause. The three part-balancing test of 
-----------------~ ~Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976) must be applied. 
(1) The personal interest is high. (2) The cost of erroneous 
' .
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deprivation is great. ( 3) The Government's legitimate 
interests are adequately protected by judicial determinations 
of competency. As the Massachusetts court found in Roe III, 
supra, in an emergency a court can make an incompetency 
determination in a matter of hours. 
Under the "police power," the State should be able to 
administer drugs only where there is clear and convincing 
evidence of impending harm. 
Petitioners argue that principles of comity and federalism 
require the Court to stay its hand in a case such as this, due 
to the magnitude of the State's parens patriae interest. This 
argument is frivolous. The issues here implicate the most 
fundamental constitutional rights. The federal courts cannot 
abdicate their responsiblity. 
Amicus briefs in support of the repsondents have been 
filed by the Massachusetts Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee, the American Pshycological Association, Patients' 
Rights Advocacy Services, Inc., and the Advocates for Basic 
Legal Equality. 
IV. ANALYSIS ON THE MERITS 
A. State and Federal Law 
Assuming that the Court does reach the merits, it will be 
\\ 
ll 
confronted with an extraordinarily complex relationship between 
state and federal law. In this section of the memorandum, I 
aim simply to describe that relationship in highly general 
terms, in order to elucidate in advance the nature of the 
problems that emerge later in the discussion. These arise 
largely because claims of both 
substantive and procedural rights. In this case the patients 
claim substantive rights to resist treatment under both . State, 
e.g., Roe III, supra, and federal law, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 
u.s., at 491-494 (identifying liberty interest of state prison 
inmates not created by state statutes). State law may also 
create procedural rights. And, if the state creates 
substantive rights, those rights--as well as federal 
substantive rights--will be entitled to federal due proc 
protection. E.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 
442 u.s., at 7. ., 
' I 
The state-fed ionship creates two main forms of 
federal law. In that case a federal constitutional opinion 
would effectively be advisory only; it would not determine the 
scope of the patients' legal rights. the scope of 
federal procedural rights may depend on the underlying state 'r-
substantive rights that the procedures must protect. 
Substantive Rights 
The parties agree that this issue requires some balancing 
of State interests against the individual's constitutional 
interests in resisting treatment. (Both seem implcitly to 
accept the need for a Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test.) 
But a deep question in cases of this kind is how to identify 
the individual's interests that may be at stake. Prima facie, ..................... ~ 
the individual may appear incompetent to assert them. In fact, 
the first "state law problem" arises at this point: It is that 
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Massachusetts provides a different standard for judging 
"incompetency" than it does for imposing involuntary 
institutionalization. Roe III, supra, 421 N.E.2d at 55. Thus, 
under Massachusetts law, even persons in mental institutions 
~ must be presumed competent to assert their own constitutional 
interests in, e.g., freedom from bodily invasion. 
In Roe III the Massachusetts court held that all persons--
incompetent as well as competent--have a right 
~~-treatment "[a]bsent a compelling State interest." 
to refuse 
Id. at 51-
52. This raises the second question: Which state interests 
rise to this level? 
In Roe III, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the 
State's "generalized parens patriae interest in removing 
obstacles to individual development does not outweigh the 
fundamental individual rights" that might be invoked . on behalf 
of the incompetent. Id. at 59-60 & n. 20. Very arguably its 
mode of analysis had a double effect. Not only does it 
announce State-law substantive rights. It may also effect a 
diminution of the State's parens patriae interest, rendering it 
narrower and therefore less weighty. 
Procedural Rights 
State law liberty interests are protected by the federal 
due process clause. E.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 u.s. 
539, 556-557 (1974). Thus, if Roe III did recognize new State 
law rights, the procedures prescribed by the courts in this 
case may no longer give the protection required by Due Process. 
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CAl showed considerable willingness to respect the judgments of 
treating physicians. But it is doubtful whether they can count 
as sufficiently competent and "neutral decisionmakers" under 
Roe III, which held that a patient's individual preferences and 
"substituted judgment" must be weighed in treatment decisions 
involving unwanted administration of drugs. 
B. Sources of State Power 
In a Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test, the individual 
interest must be weighed against the state interest. Analysis 
may best beg in with the state's asserted interests. Both the 
dist ct and CAl considered two possible sources for the State's 
IL \l 
claim to administer unwanted drugs: (1) a police power interest 
in protecting against immediate violence; and (2) a parens ,, 
patriae interest in promoting effective treatment. Under both, ------
as suggested in the preceeding discussion, two kinds of 
question arise: (a) the substantive conditions that must exist 
to justify involuntary treatment; and (b) the procedures 
necessary to protect the patient's substantive rights. 
1. Police Power 
(a) Substantive Rights 
In this Court the State's police power authority is not 
L-. seriously disputed. The dist ct held that "a committed mental 
~ patient may be forcibly medicated in an emergency situation in 
~
ich a failure to do so would result in a substantial 
likelihood of physical harm to that patient, other patients, or ,. 
to staff members of the institution." 478 F. Supp. at 1365. 




Appeals apparently required some some greater measure of 
respect for professional judgment. It termed the standard 
"overly rigid," 654 F.2d, at 634, and recognized that there 
could be no precise quantification of the likelihood of 
violence or its probable effects. What was needed was a 
"professional judgment call" based on "individualized 
estimations." Id. at 655. 
If there is any difficulty about this section of CAl's 
holding, it arises from vagueness and imprecision. But it 
would be hard to do better. The police power will justify 
medication only to prevent imminent violence. In the face of 
such a threat, I agree with CAl that professional judgment 
needs to be trusted. I think it therefore inappropriate for 
this Court to attempt to formulate a substantive standard more 
precise than that propounded by CAl. 
(b) Procedural Rights 
CAl did, however, also hold that the district court should 
seek to formulate the procedural rules necessary to provide due 
process. Again on this point, I think the approach of CAl to 
be sound. Considerable confusion unfortunately arises from the 
vagueness with which CAl framed its decision. This is 
particularly true regarding CAl's statement that the dist ct 
should "explore the possibility" that the State be required to 
find that "less restrictive means" were not available before 
drugs could be administered involuntarily. More clearly and 
significantly, however, CAl held that "the determination that 
medication is necessary must be made by a qualified physician 
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as to each individual patient to be medicated." Id. at 656. 
Given the weight of the individual's interest in not being 
drugged unnecessarily, this does not seem to me to be an 
excessive imposition on professional judgment. Further, I 
think that this ultimate deference to a doctor's professional 
judgment subsumes the court's ambiguous suggestion with regard 
to "less restrictive alternatives." 
Finally, Roe III does not seem to have raised serious 
difficulties with the "police powers" section of the CAl 
opinion. 
In sum, regarding medication under the police power, I 
think that CAl could simply be affirmed. If any critic ism is 
in order, it might be that the court failed fully to appreciate 
that "due process is a flexible concept." If for some reason a 
physician were unavailable in an emergency, prompt action by 
other personnel might be needed. As a norm, however, I think 
that individualized judgments, by a physician, should be 
required. 
2. Parens Patriae 
(a) Substantive Rights 
This is the issue that is much more problematic: When can 
the State, in order to protect interests unrelated to the 
immediate threat of violence, impose forced medication as an 
element of treatment? It is difficult, legally as well as 
practically, to know how to approach this question. There is 
no doubt that "the state has a legitimate interest under its 
parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are 
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unable to care for themselves •.•. " Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418' 426 (1979) . However, for the State to invoke this 
rationale to impose unwanted treatment, the lower courts both 
held that the individual himself must be incapable of making 
competent judgments for himself. 
It is at this point that the relationship between state 
and federal law becomes complex. The petitioners seem to argue 
that the fact of involuntary commitment necessarily suffices to 
establish incompetency to make treatment decisions as a matter 
of federal constitutional law. If this is so, it must be 
because the Massachusetts commitment standards--in order to 
survive the federal constitutional minimum, cf. O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, supra--must establish a degree of mental disability 
that makes a person incompetent (within the contemplation of 
federal law) to resist professional treatment decisions. 
Unfortunately the decision most nearly on point~O'Connor 
v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 564 (1975), gives littl~idance. 
O'Connor clearly held that, even "assuming that the 
mentally ill can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there 
is still no basis for confining such persons involuntarily if 
they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." 
Id., at 575. O'Connor thus seems to hold that a person cannot 
be institutionalized unless dangerous, either to himself of 
others. This sets a high constitutional standard, which would 
arguably suffice to justify treatment--with drugs--against the 
patient's will. On the other hand, O'Connor also seems to have 
credited the personal preferences of the mentally ill. See 
24. 
id., at 575 (" [T] he mere presence of mental illness does not 
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of 
an institution.") If their preferences are credited, then the 
State's interest in preventing violence may be sufficient to 
justify institutionalization (the "least restrictive 
alternative"), but not 
imposing a drug regimen 




prisoner retains a "residuum of 
the further intrusion of 
individual disliked. Cf. 
(1981) (even a committed 
liberty" that may not be 
infringed without due process protection). 
The issue is further complicated by the uncertain 
relevance of Massachusetts law, which establishes separate 
standards for imposing institutionalization and adjudicating 
incompetency. What is the relationship of state law--and the 
state law definitions of "commitablility" and "incompetency"--
to the federal constitutional claims presented on this appeal? 
CAl seems first to have held that the Massachusetts 
"commitment" scheme was constitutional under federal standards. 
See 634 F.2d at 659 ("The Massachusetts scheme goes well beyond 
the minimum requirements mandated by the First Amendment."). 
But it then proceeded to find that the State's commitment 
standards were inadequate to justify forced administration of 
drugs. The basis for this holding--whether rooted in federal 
scrutiny of the state standard or in the state's adoption of a 
separate "competency" statute--is somewhat unclear. 
As I read its opinion, CAl put its opinion on federal 
grounds. Again as I understand it, CAl held that 
7 
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"incompetency" was federally required before the State could 
impose mandatory drug therapy. And the Massachusetts 
commitment statute did not--as a matter of State law--require a 
finding of "incompetency" in the requisite "federal" sense. 
Thus, among the questions before the Court is this: Was 
CAl correct in holding that the federal constitution requires a 
finding of "incompetency"--distinct from a finding that someone -·-
is~ ill, ~dangerous to himself or others, and 
c:lSDneeds to be committed--before a patient can be forced to 
take drugs as an undesired element of treatment? 2 
As indicated above, I think that O'Connor v. Donaldson 
provides strong support for--although it probably does not 
require--an affirmative conclusion. Consistent with this view, 
both the district court and the court of appeals found that 
something more is needed to justify drugging a patient than to 
justify institutionalizing him in the first place. It is true, 
2
Although the processional amici are split, th~sychiatric 
profession seems en r draw a dist'n ion between mental 
illness and mental incompetence. See Joint Informa 10n Service 
o t e m 1can sych1a r1c ss'n, quoted in Plotkin, Limiting 
the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 
72 N.W. L. Rev. 461, 483 (1977}, at 489 ("It must be clearly 
understood that the establishment of a mental illness does not 
ipso facto warrant a finding of incompetency •..• From a medical 
point of view there is not, necessarily, any connection between 
the two."}. A number of states now expressly provide for 
separate adjudications to determine the competence of 
involunatrily committed mental patients. For a statutory survey 
as of December 1, 1977, see Plotkin, supra. In this case the 
defendants conceded, as a factual matter, that not all patients 
hospitalized for mental illness were incapable of making their 
own treatment decisions. See 634 F.2d at 659. 
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as petitioners argue, that the presumptive rationale for 
institutionalization is treatment. But drug therapy is 
treatment of an exceptionally intrusive kind. It involves 
restrictions of thought processes and invasions of bodily 
integrity not implicated by other forms of therapy, in which 
the patient's willing cooperation is generally required. See 
generally Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 842-843 (CA3 1981). 
Assuming, then, that "incompetency" is one prerequisite to 
the forcible administration of drugs, what other factors need 
to be considered? There is little guidance, if any, in the 
decisions of this Court. But the courts seem agreed that "mere 
~-----~-----~----------------
incompetency" is not enough. In Roe III, supra, for example, 
the Massachusetts court suggested the relevance, inter alia, 
of: the likelihood of "success"; the patient's personal drug 
history; the person's actual preferences, despite incompetence; 
and the patient's "substituted judgment "--that is, some guess 
about how he would feel about drug therapy if he were sane. The 
Third Circuit--in Rennie v. Klein, supra, 653 F.2d at 846-847--
required that drug therapy must be the "least restrictive 
alternative" with a reasonable prospect for success. CAl 
hinted at the desirability of such an analysis by medical 
decisionmakers, but seems to have fallen just short of 
requiring it. See 634 F.2d at 656. Perhaps most confusingly 
of all, the Massachusetts Supreme Court's Roe III opinion 
reaffirmed that Massachusetts law requires a "substituted 
judgment" test before drug therapy can be imposed on an 
unwilling patient. This means, in effect, that drug therapy 
\ .. '· 
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must be the alternative that the patient would choose for 
himself if he were competent to do so: "The determination of 
what the incompetent would do if competent will probe the 
incompetent individual's values and preferences." 421 N.E. 2d 
at 52. It is hard to know what this test means--and it may be 
required under Massachusetts law. It establishes, however, 
that "The question presented by the [incompetent's] refusal to 
take drugs is only incidentally a medical question." 
As I have emphasized, it is hard to know what is and is 
required under Massachusetts law, as distinct from the 
Massachusetts' courts interpretation of federal law. Assuming 
that this Court can concern itself only with federal 
substantive standards, it is very hard to develop a list of the 
relevant substantive criteria, and a bit dnagerous as well. 
Factors of this kind define "substantive," rather than 
"procedural," rights~ and it is hard to root these rights 
either in specific provisions of the constitution or in past 
decisions of this Court. Further, this is an area in which 
professional medical expertise cannot be ignored--one in which 
the possibility of judicially manageable standards must be 
doubted. 
On balance, I would be inclined to hold that a Eatient has 
a right to resist drug treatment unless: 
(a) he is incompetent~ 
(b) drug treatment is the only reasonable medical 
alternative, from the perspective of achieving either relief 
from symptoms of underlying distress or of achieving a cure. 
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Although the term is not terribly precise, the CA3 has required 
a "least restrictive alternative" analysis. 
In concluding this section, I note again, however, that 
Massachusetts law may well give incompetents a right that is 
more far reaching--a right to resist drug therapy unless they 
~
would "personally" consent under a "substituted judgment" 
analysis. 
Procedural Rights 
In any event, assuming that "something more" than 
"incompetency" is "substantively" required to justify drugging 
than is needed to justify institutionalization, it does not 
follow that the Massachusetts procedural requirement of 
"competency" adjudications needs to be "consti tutionalized." 
I I 
And most emphatically it does not follow that particular 
\..\ 
treatment decisions--decisions to administer a drug on a 
------------~-----
particular occasion--need to be made by a judge or by a court-
appointed guardian. As the petitioners argue, "competency" may 
~
vary day-by-day. Moreover, as a practical matter, a patient's 
competency to refuse treatment--just as his need for treatment-
-may need to be assessed by professionals within the hospital. 
The question is: What procedures are required? -~~ Here the decision most nearly on point is probably Parham 
~~ ~ J .R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979), in which the Court applied the 
three-factor balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335, to determine the procedures required for admitting 
children to a state mental hospital. The Court in that case 
held that a the admission decision must be made by an impartial 
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decisionmaker, but that this decisionmaker need not be a judge. 
A hospital physician would in fact suffice; and even he need 
not conduct a formal hearing. The Court held that the hospital 
must then develop internal procedures for conducting periodic 
reviews of whether institutionalization remained necessary for 
particular patients. 
It is hard to know how Parham might bear on the case at 
hand. The Mathews v. Eldridge test plainly cannot be applied 
in the usual way. The first factor would require an 
assessment of the patient's interest in avoiding treatment. 
Yet the patient's own assertion of his interests cannot be 
credited in the usual way. Precisely what is in issue is 
whether the patient is compent to know his own interests. 
Further, it is hard to weigh the "risk of erroneous 
deprivation" without making medical judgments about the 
likelihood of "success" and the risk of serious "side-effects." 
CAl attempted to deal with this complexity in the 
following way: 
(1) Reversing the dist court, it held that judicial 
determinations of incompetency should not be required in cases 
where delay "could result in significant deterioration of the 
patient's mental health." 634 F.2d, at 660. It remanded for 
the district court to develop procedures applicable in such 
situations. 
(2) It held that some judicial determination of 
incompetency must otherwise be made. But it suggested that the 
requisite substantive and procedural standards could be 
. .. ~ \' 
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somewhat looser than those currently prescribed by 
Massachusetts statute. 
{3) It held that some on-the-spot procedures would then 
be required before drugs could be involuntarily administered in 
a particular instance. But it did not say what those 
procedures should be, beyond suggesting--which is important--
that they should weigh the patient's subjective preferences as 
well as his rational best interests; it left the elaboration of 
this standard for the remand to the district court. CAl 
specifically reversed a holding of the district court that the 
decisions must be made by court-appointed guardians. 
If there is anything objectionable about CAl's decision 
concerning the state's parens patriae power--Roe III 
difficulties aside--it might be the requirement that the 
initial determination of a patient's incompetency should 
require judicial decision. Nonetheless, this seems to me to be 
a very close issue. Such a requirement would be time-consuming 
and expensive; and it is hard to know what a judge could 
responsibly do to assess the professional judgment of an 
institutional psychiatrist. See Parham v. J.R., supra {due 
process satisfied by decisions of doctors in children's 
psychiatric hospital); but cf. Vitek v. Jones, supra, 445 u.s., 
at 496-497 {"the medical nature of the inquiry [whether a 
prisoner needs to be transferred to a psychiatric hospital] 
does not justify dispensing with due process requirements," 
including judicial hearing. 
As indicated above, however, the forced administration of 
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drugs threatens interests in bodily integrity and freedom of 
thought. The importance of any unjustified violation counsels 
the provision of judicial review at least at some point. If 
Massachusetts inquired into "competency" as a prerequisite to 
commitment, this might suffice. As a matter of state law, 
however, it does not. Under these circumstances, I think CAl 
was right to require a judicial determination of competency 
before drugs could ever be administered to an unwilling 
patient. In assessing the intrusion on hospital management, it 
is important, I think, that CAl held that this judicial 
determination must only be made once. Cf. Roe III, 421 N.E.2d, 
at 51-52 {requiring judicial approval of each administration of 
drugs, on the theory that the question was generally of of 
"substituted judgment", to which medical expertise was 
irrelevant). 
the intitial determination of incompetency, CAl 
I 
After 
suggested that some on-the-spot procedures might be required, 
but that the decision would be made by doctors, not judges. 
This is consistent with the model outlined in Parham v. J.R., 
supra. It also accords with the "compromise" proposal made in 
the amicus brief of the American College of 
Neuropsychopharmacology. These procedures should not need to 
be in an adversary mode, which would create stress not 
conducive to the success of long-range treatment. Amici have 
suggested that this review might occur before an institutional 
committee of one or another kind. Personally, I would tend to 
favor such a suggestion; but I understand the need for 
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flexibility, and I am uncertain about the effects of such 
procedures on doctor-patient relations. 
Finally, with regard to Roe III, I believe that it has 
very arguably created new state-law rights to resist unwanted 
medication and placed new restrictions on the scope of the 
State's parens patriae interest as a matter of Massachusetts 
law. Since federal due process attaches to state law 
substantive rights, I think that the Roe decision strongly 
counsels a DIG or a remand for reconsideration in light of Roe 
III. However, if the Court wishes to decide the case as 
presented, I reiterate that the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
explicitly distinguished this case from the one before it. 
B. Federalism Issue 
Petitioners have also raised the argument that the lower 
federal courts violated important principles of federalism by 
seeking to control state behavior in an area of its parens 
patriae concern. Neither party devotes much briefing to this 
issue, which I think insubstantial. The claims raised in the 
district court involved important constitutional rights--a 
matter of obvious federal concern. Further, no argument is 
made to differentiate this case from other areas of state 
concern--such as prison conditions and school desegregation--
that equally implicate central interests of the State. 3 
3see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 405 (1974) ("A 
policy of ]Ud1c1al restra1nt cannot encompass any failure to take 
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a 
federal or state institution."). 
33. 
SUMMARY 
:;:I think that the Court should either DIG or remand for 
/ conisderation in light of Roe III, supra. Roe III strongly 
"">:::: 
. .JIV.· -•~ suggest s--al though it does not explicitly , hold--that men 
!f'V". y . . \\ 
~ ;/ pa:_ients have '~~te law :_u~t~ve rights n~
.~:/--~ the dist ct or by CAl in this case. If so, those rights 
~.J.Y7 "liberty interests" created by state law. As such, they are 




Court does reach the merits, ~ should hold that 
mental patients have constitutional in)!e!?!~s that may be 
1 - ;;itt;;;zt ~
offended by f orced administration of drugs~-first amendment 
interests in ({;;§o;:~t~ ~r}:vac( inte~ in 
freedom from bodily invasion. To determine when drugs may be 
administered to unwilling patients, these interests must be 
weighed against the competing state interests. 
Police Power Interest. Substantively, CAl held that drugs
1 1 
could be administered involuntar_i ly Q_nly<tfo prevent · mediat ' ' 
phy~nce. Procedurally, it held tha '2-: the decision 
I think that both the substantive must be made by a physician. 
-------------~-------~-----and procedural holdings should be affirmed. 
Parens Patriae Interest. CAl held tha~ this interest will 
justify the forced drugging only of patients adjudicated to be 
"incompetent." When a patient is "incompetent," the State's 
parens patriae interest will justify efforts to restore 
competency. Beyond that, it suggested in vague terms that 
further conditions should be satisfied. I am in general 
34. 
agreement with this approach. Even if a patient is 
incompetent, other factors--such as prognosis, side-effects, 
personal and religious preferences of the patient, etc.--should 
also be considered. It is hard, however, to know whether the 
construction of a list of factors lies within the judicial 
competence. '11to 
Procedurally, CAl required an initial adjudication of 
incompetency; then, before drugs could be administered on a 
particular occasion, further on-the-spot procedures would be 
required. The court did not state what these might be. This 
Court might suggest that a physician could decide, cf. Parham, 
supra; or it might suggest the desirability of review by a 
hospital committee. Either would be consistent with the vague 
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Dick DATE: March 16, 1982 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
~7 
80-~ Mills v. Rogers 
Your first draft (3/16) is very well done. Apart 
from minor editing and a question or two, I have no changes. 
A few questions are noted in the margin. In 
addition, I am not entirely clear as to what you are saying 
in Subpart C, especially on page 15 and 16. In prior 
sections, you have correctly noted that both substantive and 
procedural issues are presented by the case. It seems to me 
that this distinction is not clearly maintained in some of 
what is said in Subpart C. 
After stating that Roe III appears to recognize 
liberty interests more broadly than the Constitution 
requires, the draft says: "If so, these state recognized 
interests may be entitled to the protection of procedural 
due process". This is clear. In the next sentence, 
however, you say that it therefore "would be unnecessary for 
this Court (or the Court of Appeals) to determine the scope 
of substantive protection, citing Ashwander. In general 
terms, the substantive interst is the right of a patient to 
decline drugs of this kind. But this right can be defined, 
as well as the interests to be weighed against it, in 
2. 
different ways. Is it clear, therefore, that determination 
of what process is "due" would invariably make it 
unnecessary for this Court to consider the appropriate 
definition of the substantive right? I read Roe III as 
finding a substantive right - regardless of mental capacity 
- to reject medication, and at least where anti-psychotic 
drugs are concerned the Massachusetts court would go so far 
procedurally as to require that this substantive right be 
protected by the appointment of a guardian who would make a 
substitute judgment in every case. Would this procedure 
foreclose the possibility of our concluding, if the case 
comes back, that the state constitutional right does not 
comport with the federal right? 
Probably I simply do not understand this 
particular page or two, and may need to read it more 
carefully. 
I think it is almost self evident that 
Massachusetts has gone well beyond any federal 
constitutional right in both its view of substantive and 
procedural rights. I am tempted to say this, but agree that 
you have gone about as far as we properly can in this 
respect. 
One final unimportant comment: I do not like to 
have so many footnotes. Each one, when read by itself, 




object if you concluded that two or three notes are 
expendable or at least can be shortened. 
This case is in an extremely important and 
evolving area of the law. We are in agreement that you and 
Mary should be in accord in the terminology used as well as 
in any reasoning that may be relevant to both cases. As 
David has taken a preliminary look at Mary's case, perhaps a 
"tripartite" editing among the three of you is desirable. 
I appreciate your moving ahead so promptly - and 
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in Subpart c, especially on page 15 and 16. In prior 
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that this distinction i .. s not clearly mai.ntained in some of 
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however, you say that it therefore "would be unnecessary for 
this Court (or the Cour.t of Appeals) to determine the scope 
of substantive protection, citing Ashwander. In general 
terms, the substantive lnterst is the right of a patient to 
decline drugs of this kind. But this right can be defined, 
as well as the interests to be weighed against it, in 
•; .. ,. 
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2. 
different ways. Is it clear, therefore, that determination 
of what process is "due" would invariably make it 
unnecessary for this Court to consider the appropriate 
definition of the substantive right? I read Roe III as 
finding a substantive right - regardless of mental capacity 
- to reject medication, and at least where anti-psychotic 
drugs are concerned the Massachusetts court would go so far 
procedurally as to require that this substantive right be 
protected by the appointment of a quar.dian \'lho would make a 
substitute judgment in every case. Would this procedure 
foreclose the possibility of our concluding, if the case 
comes back, that the state constitutional right does not 
comport with the federal right? 
Probably I simply do not understand this 
particular page or two, and may need to read it more 
carefully. 
I think it is almost self evident that 
Massachusetts has gone we11 beyond any federal 
constitutional right in both its view of substantive and 
procedural rights. I am tempted to say this, but agree that 
you have gone about as far as we properly can in this 
respect. 
One final unimportant comment: '[ do not like to 
have so many footnotes. Each one, when read by itself, 
seems iustifiable if not affirmatively helpful. I would not 
:1. 
object if you concluded that two or three notes are 
expendable or at least can be shortened. 
3. 
This case is in an extremely important and 
evolving area of the law. We are in agreement that you and 
Mary should be in accord in the terminology used as well as 
in any reasoning that may be relevant to both cases. As 
David has taken a preliminary look at Mary's case, perhaps a 
"triparttte" editing among the three of. you is riesirable. 
I appreciate your moving ahead so promptly - and 
so well - with this draft. 
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FIRST DRAFT 
No. 80-1417, Mills v. Rogers 10 
The Court granted certiorari in this case to 15 
determine whether involuntarily committed mental patients 
have a constitutional right to refuse treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs. 
I 
This litigation began on April 27, 1975, when 20 
respondent Rubie Rogers and six other persons filed suit 
2. 
against various officials and staff of the May and Austin 
Units of the Boston State Hospital. The plaintiffs all 
were present or former mental patients at the institution. 
During their period of institutionalization all had been 25 
forced to accept unwanted treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs . 1 \ Alleging that forcible administration of these 
drugs violated rights protected by the Constitution of the 
United States, the plaintiffs--respondents here--sought 
1As used in this litigation, the term 
"antipsychotic drugs" refers to medications such as 
Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixis and Haldol that are used in 
treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. See Rogers 
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359-1360 (D. Mass. 1979), 
aff'd in part and reversed in part, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (CAl 
1981). Sometimes called "major tranquilizers, these 
compounds were introduced into psychiatry in the early 
1950s. See Cole & Davis, Antipsychotic Dru~s, in 2 A. 
Freeman, H. Kaplan, and B. Sadock, Comprehens1ve Textbook 
of Psychiatry II 1921 (2d ed. 1975). It is not disputed 
that such drugs are "mind-altering." Their effectiveness 
resides in their capacity to achieve such effects. Citing 
authorities, petitioners assert that such drugs are 
essential not only to the treatment of individual 
disorders, but also to the preservation of institutional 
order generally needed for effective therapy. See Brief 
for Petitioners 17-41, 54-100. Respondents dispute this 
claim, also with support from medical authorities. 
Respondents also emphasize that antipsychotic drugs carry 
a significant risk of adverse side effects. These include 
such neurological syndromes as parkinsonisms, 
characterized by mask-like face, retarded volitional 
movements, and tremors; akathasis, a clinical term for 
restlessness; dystonic reacions, including grimacing and 
muscle spasms; and tardive dyskinesia, characterized by 
involuntary muscle movements, especially around the mouth. 
See Rogers v. Okin, supra, 478 F. Supp., at 1360; Byck, 
Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in L. 
Goodman and A. Gilman, The Pharmalogical Basis of 
Thearpeutics 169 (2d ed. 1975). Unlike the other three 
syndroms, tardive dyskinesia may persist long after drug 
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3. 
compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. 2 30 
The District Court certified the case as a class 
action. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 n.l 
(D.Mass. 1979). Although denying relief in damages, the 
court held that mental patients enjoy constitutionally 
protected liberty and privacy interests in deciding for 35 
themselves whether to submit to drug therapy. 3 The 
District Court found that an involuntary "commitment" 
provided no basis for an inference of legal "incompetency" 
to make this decision under Massachusetts law. Id. , at 
1359-1362. 4 Until a judicial finding of incompetency had 40 
2The plaintiffs also presented constitutional and 
statutory challenges to a hospital pol icy of secluding 
patients against their will. 478 F. Supp., at 1352. 
Their complaint additionally asserted various claims under 
state tort law. Id., at 1352, 1383. The District Court 
held that state law prevented seclusion except where 
necessary to prevent violence. See id., at 1371, 1374. 
Neither this decision, nor the denial of relief on the 
state tort law claims, is in issue before this Court. 
3The District Court characterized liberty to make 
"the intimate decision whether to accept or refuse 
[antipsychotic] medication" as "basic to any right of 
privacy" and therefore protected by the Constitution. See 
478 F. Supp., at 1366. It did not derive this right from 
any particular constitutional provision, although it did 
observe that the "concept of a right of privacy 
embodies First Amendment concerns." Ibid. In relying on 
the First Amendment the court reasoned that "the power to 
produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to 
communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional 
protection." Id., at 1367. 
4under the common law of torts, the right to refuse 
any medical treatment emerged from the doctrines of 
trespass and battery, which were applied to unauthorized 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
been made, the court concluded, the wishes of the patients 
generally must be respected. Id., at 1365-1368. Even 
when a state court had rendered a determination of 
incompetency, the District Court found that the patient's 
right to make treatment decisions was not forfeited, but 45 
must be exercised on his behalf by a court-appointed 
guardian. Id., at 1364. Without consent either by the 
patient or his guardian, the court held, the patient's 
liberty interests could be overridden only in an 
emergency. 5 
touchings by a pqysician. See, e.g., Superintendent of 
Belchertown Hospital v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 
(Mass. 1977): W. Prosser, Torts § 18 (4th ed. 1971). In 
this case the defendants had argued--as they continue to 
argue--that the judicial committment proceedings conducted 
under Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 
(1979) , provided a determination of incompetency 
sufficient to warrant the State in providing treatment 
over the objections of the patient. In rejecting this 
argument as a matter of state law, the District Court 
relied principally on · the language of the relevant 
Massachusetts statutes and on the regulations of the 
Department of Mental Health. See 478 F. Supp., at 1359, 
1361 (citing Department of Mental Health Regulation § 
221.02 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to 
manages his affairs ..• solely by reason of his admission 
or commitment to a facility except where there has been an 
adjudication that such person is incompetent"), and Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, § 25 ("No person shall be deemed 
to be incompetent to manage his affairs solely by 
reason of his admission or commitment in any capacity 
•••. "). The court also appears to have engaged in 
independent fact-finding leading to the same conclusion: 
"The weight of the evidence persuades this court that, 
although committed mental patients do suffer at least some 
impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able 
to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may 
reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
50 
5. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed 
in part and reversed in part. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 
Jt-
650 (1981}. Th.eo~~'tlieo!t-,.QPI'f.,t: ..... "TO,.,f"'--f1flr!~.,..~!'l'le~a""'l:~e A a g r e e d that menta 1 
patients had a constitutionally protected interest in 
deciding for themselves whether to undergo treatment with 55 
antispychotic drugs. 6 Id. , at 6 53. It also accepted the 
trial court's conclusion that Massachusetts law recognized 
even involuntarily committed persons as presumptively 
competent to assert this interest in their own behalf. 
See id., at 657-659. The Court of Appeals reached 
different conclusions, however, as to the circumstances 
under which state interests might override the liberty 
medication." 478 F. Supp., at 1361. 
5The District Court defined an emergency as a 
situation in which failure to medicate "would result in a 
substantial likelihood of physical harm to the patient, 
other patients, or to staff members of the institution." 
478 F. Supp., at 1365. 
6The Court of Appeals termed it "intuitively 
obvious" that "a person has a constitutionally protected 
interest in being left free by the state to decide for 
himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially 
harmful medical treatment that is represented by the 
administration of antipsychotic drugs." 634 F.2d, at 653. 
Although the Court of Appeals found that the "precise 
textual source in the Constitution for the protection of 
this interests is unclear," ibid., it concluded that "a 
source in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution for 
the protection of this interest exists, most likely as 
part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, 
or personal security." Ibid. The Court of Appeals found 
it unnecessary to examine the conclusion of the District 
Court that First Amendment interests also were implicated. 
60 
6. 
interests of the patient. 
The Court of Appeals found that the State had two 
interests 
~~- ,.., .......... /-~ ~·k.,, ~.r. •• :..r ~ 
potentiall~ iD COmQ~itJOD wjt~ liberty 
interests asserted by the patient: a police power interest 
in maintaining order within the institution and in 
preventing violence, see 634 F.2d, at 655, and a parens 
patriae interest in alleviating the sufferings of mental 
65 
illness and in providing clinically effective treatment, 70 
see 634 F.2d, at 657. The court held that the State, 
under its police powers, could administer medication 
forcibly only upon a determination that "the need to 
prevent violence in a particular situation outweighs the 
possibility of harm to the medicated individual" and that 75 
"reasonable alternatives to the administration of 
antipsychotics [have been] ruled out." 634 F.2d, at 656. 
Criticizing the District Court for imposing what it 
regarded as a more rigid standard, the Court of Appeals 
held that a hospital's professional staff must have 80 
substantial discretion in deciding when an impending 
emergency required involuntary medication. 7 The Court of 
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages. 
7. 
Appeals reserved to the District Court, on remand, the 
task of developing mechanisms to ensure that staff 
decisions under the "police power" standard accorded 85 
adequate procedural protection to "the interests of the 
patients." 8 
With regard to the State's parens patriae powers, the 
Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's state law 
distinction between patients who had and patients who had 90 
not been adjudicated incompetent. Where a patient had not 
been found judicially to be "incompetent" to make 
treatment decisions under Massachusetts law, 9 the court 
ruled that the parens patriae interest would justify 
involuntary medication only when necessary to prevent 95 
7The Court of Appeals held that the District Court 
had erred in requiring what it construed as an overly 
simplistic mathematical calculation of the "quantitative" 
likelihood of harm. See 634 F.2d, at 656. 
8 rt asserted, apparently as a m1n1mum, that "the 
determination that medication is necessary must be made by 
a qualified physician as to each individual patient to be 
medicated." 634 F.2d, at 656. 
9A number of other States also distinguish between 
the standards governing involuntary commitment and those 
applying to determinations of incompetency to make 
treatment decisions. For a survey as of December 1, 1977, 
see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental 
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
461, 504-525 (1977). Several courts of appeals have held 
that civil commitment does not raise even a presumption of 
incompetence. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (CA2 
1971): Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (CA3 1976). 
8. 
further deterioration in the patient's mental health. See 
6 3 4 F . 2d , at 6 6 0 • The Court of Appeals rever sed the 
District Court's conclusion that a guardian must be 
appointed to make non-emergency treatment decisions on 
behalf of incompetent patients. Even for incompetent 100 
patients, however, it ruled that the State's parens 
patriae interest would justify prescription only of such 
treatment as would be accepted voluntarily by "the 
individual himself ..• were he competent" to decide. Id., 
at 661. 10 Procedurally, the Court of Appeals held that 105 
the patient's interest in avoiding undesired drug 
treatment generally must be protected by a judicial 
determination of "incompetency." 11 If such a 
10 In imposing this "substituted judgment" standard 
the Court of Appeals appears to have viewed its holding as 
mandated by the Federal Constitution. See ibid. ("In so 
holding, we do not imply that the Constitution ••.. ). But 
it followed its ultimate substantive conclusion with a 
citation to a Massachusetts case: "Cf. Superintendant of 
Belchertown v. Saikewicz," 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 
(1978) . Saikewicz held that a court must apply the 
"substituted jbdgment" standard in determining whether to 
approve painful medical treatment for a profoundly 
retarded man incapable of giving informed consent. In 
Saikewicz the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appears 
to have relied on both the Federal Constitution and the 
law of Massachusetts to support its decision. See id., at 
424-425. But it also referred to "the constitut1onal 
right to privacy," id., at 426, thus creating some doubt 
as to the extent that the decision had an independent 
state law basis. 
Footnote(s) 11 will appear on following pages. 
9 • 
determination were made, further on-the-scene procedures 
still would be required before antipsychotic drugs could 110 
be administered forcibly in a particular instance. Id., 
at 661. 12 
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals involved 
constitutional issues of potentially broad significance, 13 
we granted certiorari. u.s. (1982). 
1 IY :As 
II 
A 
tbe conr: t of Appeals een:eet:ly emphas izea.,----rh.e 
~ 
principal question on which we granted certiorar~~ether 
an involuntarily committed mental patient has a 
11The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with 
the District Court that this determination, under 
Massachusetts law, would require a decision by the probate 
court under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 § 25; see ch. 201 
§§ 1, 6, 12, 12 (appointment and powers of guardians). It 
suggested, however, that non-judicial procedures would 
satisfy the federal constitutional requirements of due 
process. See 634 F.2d, at 659-660. 
12The Court of Appeals again instructed the 
District Court to develop procedurals safeguards adequate 
to protect the patient's substantive interests. See 634 
F.2d, at 661. 
13consti tutional questions involving the rights of 
committed mental patients to refuse antipsychotic drugs 
have been presented in other recent cases, including 
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (CA3 1980), and Davis v. 
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ohio 1980). On the issues 
raised, see generally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating 
the Control of Behavior Control: Autonom and the Coercive 




constitutional right to refuse treatment with 
~~~ 
antipsychotic drugs~ 4~as0both substantive and procedural 
aspects. 634 F.2d, at 656, 661: see Rennie v. Klein, 653 
F • 2 d 8 3 6 , 8 41 ( CA 3 19 81} • The parties agree that the 
Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the 125 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15 The 
substantive issue thus involves a definition of that 
protected constitutional interest, as well as 
identification of the conditions under which competing 
state interests might outweigh it. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 130 
4 41 U • S • 5 2 0 , 56 0 ( 19 7 9 } : Roe v . Wade , 41 0 U • S • 113 , at 
147-154 (1973}: Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905} . 16 The procedural issue concerns the minimum 
14Pet. la. 
15 rn this Court petitioners appear to concede the 
existence of a constitutional interest in freedom from 
bodily invasion, see Brief for Petitioners at 42-49, but 
they deny that this interest is "fundamental." They also 
assert that it is outweighed in an appropriate balancing 
test by compelling state interests in administering 
antipsychotic drugs. Id., at 54-68. 
16This is illustrated by the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals. The court began by recognizing an individual 
liberty interest. It then found that the State had two 
interests potentially in competition with that liberty 
interest--a police power interest in maintaining order 
within the institution and preventing violence, see 634 
F.2d, at 655, and a parens patriae interest in alleviating 
the sufferings of mental illness and in providing 
clinically effective treatment, see 634 F.2d, at 657. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals balanced the State's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
procedures required by the Constitution for determining 
that the individual's liberty interest actually is 135 
outweighed in a particular instance. 
The substantive and procedural issues both are 
intertwined with state law. State law may define liberty 
interests that, once defined, are protected by the due 
process clause of the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., 140 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980); Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Wolff v. 
MeDon n e 11 , 418 U • S • 5 3 9 , 5 56-5 5 7 ( 19 7 4) • In add i t ion , a 
State may confer procedural protections of liberty 
interests that extend beyond those minimally required by 145 
the Constitution of the United States. See, e.g., Kremer 
v. Chemical Construction Corp., u.s. __ , (1982). 
If a State does so, the procedures minimally required by 
the Federal Constitution need not be identified. 
B 
Roughly five months after the Court of Appeals 
interests separately against the liberty interests of 
patients who had been committed involuntarily, and reached 
different conclusions in the two cases. 
150 
12. 
decided this case, and shortly after this Court granted 
certiorari, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
announced its decision in In the Matter of Guardianship of 
Richard Roe, III, 421 N.E. 2d 40 {1981) {"Roe III"). Roe 155 
III involved the right of a noninstitutionalized but 
mentally incompetent person to refuse treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs. Expressly resting its decision on 
the common law of Massachusetts as well as on the Federal 
Constitution, 17 Massachusetts' highest court held in Roe 160 
III that a person has a protected liberty interest in 
"'decid [ing] for himself whether to submit to the serious 
and potentially harmful medical treatment that is 
represented by the administration of antipsychotic 
drugs.'" 420 N.E. 18 2d, at 51 n. 9. The court found--
17 See 421 N.E. 2d, at 42 and n.l, 51 n.9. 
18Al though the Massachusetts court quoted this 
formulation from the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Mills v. Rogers, supra, 634 F.2d, at 653, the quotation is 
used to define the right, rather than to identify its 
legal source. Roe III noted that Mills v. Rogers had 
found the source of this right in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court continued its 
discussing by stating its reliance on three bases, two of 
then not cited in Mills v. Rogers: the "inherent power of 
the court to prevent mistakes or abuses by guardians, 
whose authority comes from the Commonwealth," and the 
"common law" right of persons to decide what will be done 
with their bodies. 420 N.E.2d, at 51 n.9. 
165 
13. 
again apparently on the basis of the common law of 
Massachusetts as well as the Constitution of the United 
States--that this interest of tqe individual was of such 
importance that it could be overcome only by "an 
overwhelming state interest." Id., at 51. Roe III 170 
further held that a person did not forfeit his protected 
liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompetent, but 
a-
rather remained entitled to have ]).i-S "substituted 
judgment" exercised on his behalf. Ibid. Defining this 
"substituted judgment" as one for which "[n]o medical 175 
expertise is required," id., at 52, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court required a judicial determination of 
substituted judgment before drugs could be administered in 
a particular instance, 19 except possibly in cases of a 
19s 'b'd ee 1 1 • : 
"The determination of what the incompetent 
individual would do if competent will probe the 
incompetent individual's values and preferences, 
and such an inquiry, in a case involving 
antipsychotic drugs [and a noninsti tutionalized 
but incompetent patient], is best made in courts (l __ J~~-~~ 
of competent jurisdiction." ~ , 
Having held that "a ward possesses but is incap 
exercising personally" the right to refuse an tip ychotic 
drugs, the Massachusetts Supreme Court viewed the "primary 
dispute" as over "who ought to exercise this right on 
behalf of the ward." Id., at 51. The Supreme Court in 
Roe III identified siX''relevant" but "not exclusive" 
factors that should guide the decisions of the lower 
Footnote continued on next page. 
14. 
medical emergency. 20 180 
c 
In Roe III the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated 
that its decision was limited to cases involving 
noninstitutionalized mental patients. See 420 N.E.2d, at . 
21 42, 55, 61-62. -Nonetheless, respondents have argued in 185 i\ 
this Court that Roe III may influence the correct 
disposition of the case at hand. ~, 
Especially in the wake of Roe III, it is distinctly 
possible that Massachusetts state law recognizes liberty 
interests of incompetent persons broader than those 
protected directly by the Constitution of the United 
----------~~~-- ~ 
courts: .. (~·(~·the ward's expressed pre-ferences regarding 
treatment; (2') his religious beliefs; (31''the impact upon 
the ward's family; (4") 1Vthe probability of adverse side 
effects; (1) Vthe consequences if treatment is refused; and 
(ji')VIthe prognosis with treatment ... Id., at 57. It 
e'mphasized that the determination 11 must --rg'Ive the fullest 
possible expression to the character and circumstances' 11 
of the individual patient and that 11 this is ~ subjective 
rather than an objective determination ... Id., at 56. 
20see id., at 54-55. 
21But cf. id., at 50 ( 11 because of the likelihood of 
the necessTty of making similar determinations in 
other cases, we establish guidelines regarding the 
criteria to be used and the procedures to be followed in 
making a substituted judgment determination 11 ), and at 62 
(
11 We do not mean to imply that these patients' rights are 
wholly unprotected or that their circumstances are 
entirely dissimilar to those we have discussed. we do, 
suggest, however, that it would be imprudent to establish 
prematurely the relative importance of adverse interests .... " ) . 
15. 
States. Compare Roe III, supra, 420 N.E.2d, at 51 
(protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment 
continues even when a person becomes incompetent and 
~ 
creates a right of incompetents to have their "substituted 
; 
195 
judgment" determined} with Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 429-430 (1979} (because a person "who is suffering 
from a debilitating mental illness" is not "wholly at 
liberty," and because the complexities of psychiatric 
~ 
diagnosis "reder certainties virtually beyond reach," 200 
" 
"practical considerations" may require "a compromise 
between what it is possible to prove and what protects the 
rights of the individual"}. If so, those state-recognized 
interests may be entitled to the protection of procedural 
due process under the Federal Constitution. But in that 205 
case it would be unnecessary for this Court or indeed for 
the Court of Appeals to determine the scope of the 
substantive protection that the Constitution affords 
against the involuntary administration of antipsychotic 
drugs. 22 The broader protections afforded by state law 210 
22It is this Court's settled policy to avoid 
unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues in cases 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
would be controlling. 
Procedurally, it also is quite possible that a 
Massachusetts court, as a matter of state law, would 
require greater protection of relevant liberty interests 
than the minimum adequate to survive e,,t~r the 215 
due process clause. Compare Roe III, supra, 420 N.E.2d, 
at 51 ("We have ..• stated our preference for judicial 
resolution of certain legal issues arising from proposed 
extraordinary medical treatment .••• ") with Parham v. J.R., 
supra, 442 U.S., at 608 n.l6 (Courts must not "unduly 220 
burden[] the legitimate efforts of the States to deal with 
difficult social problems. The judicial model for fact-
finding for all constitutionally protected interests, 
regardless of their nature, can turn rational 
decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise.") • 23 
presenting possible alternative bases for decision. See, 
e.g., Citf of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, u.s. , 
___ (1982 ; New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 u.s. 
568, 582-583 n.22 (1979); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 297 u.s. 288, 347-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). This policy is supported, although not 
always required, by the prohibition against advisory 
opinions. Cf. United States v. Hastings, 296 u.s. 188, 
193 (1935) (review of one basis for a decision supported 
by another basis not subject to examination would 
represent "an expression of abstract opinion"). 
23Even prior to Roe III, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that Massachusetts state law, which it construed 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Again on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of 
the procedural issues in the case at bar, which then 
would present no proper occasion for us to decide what 
procedures would represent the constitutional minimum. 
Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains 230 
unchanged by Roe III, the federally mandated procedures 
will depend on the nature and weight of the state 
interests, as well as the individual interests, that are 
asserted. To identify the nature and scope of state 
A 1..uJ._ 
interests that are to be ~ed against an individual's 
liberty interests, this Court frequently has consulted 
state law. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113, 148 and 
n.42, 151 and nn.48-50 (1973); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 661-663 (1977). We view the underlying state 
235 
~-
~-c. v w~Lq_, 
1/.V -'J~f 
~ Ct.A.,..-
~~~-t- Pf ~u.v... I 
~~'!~ 
~ t, _.. 
law predicate for weighing asserted state interests as 240 
as requiring judicial determinations of incompetency 
separate from involuntary commitment proceedings, see 634 
F.2d, at 658-659, "in many respects .•• goes well beyond 
the minimum requirements mandated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment," id., at 659. Roe III now has taken the 
further step of requ1r1ng judicial procedure in every 
instance in which a guardian believes drug therapy 
necessary for a noninstitutional i zed incompetent. L From 
our perspective of unfamiliarity with Massachusetts law, 
we hesitate to draw inferences--either positive or 
negative--about how a Massachusetts court would determine 
the procedural rights of institutionalized incompetents 
under the law of that State. 
) 
18. 
being put into doubt, if not altered, by Roe III. 24 
Because the Court of Appeals 
questions of Massachusetts law, it is better situated than 
we to determine how Roe I II may have changed the law of 
Massachusetts and how any changes may affect this case. 245 
Based on its greater familiarity with Massachusetts law, 
the Court of Appeals should determine in the first 
instance whether the decision in Roe III fairly requires a 
certification of potentially dispositive state law 
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 250 
See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 u.s. 132, 150-151 (1976) . 25 
The Court of Appeals also may consider whether this is a 
case in which abstention now is appropriate. See 
generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-819 (1976). Moreover, in 255 
an area where important federal questions are interrelated 
-'=-LL1-f.t;)' i"'f ~~ ~ 
24 In Roe III the Massachusetts court ~ explicitly 
considered the implicated state interests, see 420 N.E.2d, 
at 59, and concluded that the trial judge had erred in 
finding that the State had a "vital" parens patriae 
interest in "seeing that its residents function at the 
maximum level of their capacity," ibid. ~ -
25A certification procedure 
Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 
/ 
ovided by Mass. 
;1-e_ Cf t.U '.t 
1/t-\. 
~~ c~ 
/)4...../7> ~ ~ 
·f C--v/-#( ~ ) 
~~~; ~ ~ y- w~J/\ -- ~1~,1 
Ut ~t-;;t..U""'V /~ t-t-A-~ 19. 
'"r) ~t z &:, ~ / <!'?"-~ 
de-cj.§Jonmaklng to give the 
Court of Appeals an opportunity to cl~rify how it 
perceives the relationship between state and federal law .. 
,.)' 
III 
of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1417 
MARKJ. MILLS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
RUBIE ROGERS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1982] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Court granted certiorari in this case to determine 
whether involuntarily committed mental patients have a con-
stitutional right to refuse .treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 
I 
This litigation began on April 27, 1975, when respondent 
Rubie Rogers and six other persons filed suit against various 
officials and staff of the May and Austin Units of the Boston 
State Hospital. The J*aintiffs all were present or former 
mental patients at the institution. During their period of in-
stitutionalization all had been forced to accept unwanted 
treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 1 Alleging that forcible 
'As used in this litigation, the term "antipsychotic drugs" refers to 
medications such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixis and Haldol that are used 
in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 
F. Supp. 1342, 1359-1360 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and reversed in 
part, 634 F. 2d 650, 653 (CAl 1981). Sometimes called "major tranquiliz-
ers, these compounds were introduced into psychiatry in the early 1950s. 
See Cole & Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 2 A. Freeman, H. Kaplan, and 
B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry II 1921 (2d ed. 1975). 
It is not disputed that such drugs are "mind-altering." Their effectiveness 
resides in their capacity to achieve such effects. Citing authorities, peti-











2 MILLSv. ROGER~ 
administration of these drugs v!,o~ rights protected by the 
Constitution of the United States, the plaintiffs-respond-
ents here-sought c~mp satory and punitive damages and 
injunctive relief. 2 
The District Court ertified the case as a class action. See 
Rogers v. Okin, 478 . Supp. 1342, 1352 n. 1 (D.Mass. 1979). 
Although denying relief in damages, the court held that men-
tal patients enjoy constitutionally protected liberty and pri-
vacy interests in deciding for themselves whether to submit 
to drug therapy.3 The District Court found that an involun-
tary "commitment" provided no basis for an inference of legal 
individual disorders, but also to the preservation of institutional order gen-
erally needed for effective therapy. See Brief for Petitioners 17-41, 
54-100. Respondents dispute this claim, also with support from medical 
authorities. Respondents also emphasize that antipsychotic drugs carry a 
significant risk of adverse side effects. These include such neurological 
syndromes as parkinsonisms, characterized by mask-like face, retarded vo-
litional movements, and tremors; akathasis, a clinical term for restlessness; 
dystonic reacions, including grimacing and muscle spasms; and tardive 
dyskinesia, characterized by involuntary muscle movements, especially 
around the mouth. See Rogers v. Okin, supra, 478 F. Supp., at 1360; 
Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in L. Goodman 
and A. Gilman, The Pharmalogical Basis of Thearpeutics 169 (2d ed. 1975). 
2 The ~s also presented constitutional and statutory challenges to 
a hospital policy of secluding patients against their will. 4 78 F. Supp., at 
1352. Their complaint additionally asserted claims for damages under 
state tort law. Id., at 1352, 1383. The District Court held that state law 
prevented seclusion except where necessary to prevent violence. See id., 
at 1371, 1374. Neither this decision, nor the denial of relief on the dam-
ages claims, is in issue before this Court. 
' The District Court characterized liberty to make "the intimate decision 
whether to accept or refuse [antipsychotic] medication" as "basic to any 
right of privacy" and therefore protected by the Constitution. See 4 78 F . 
Supp., at 1366. It did not derive this right from any particular constitu-
tional provision, although it did observe that the "concept of a right of pri-
vacy . . . embodies First Amendment concerns." Ibid. In relying on the 
First Amendment the court reasoned that "the power to produce ideas is 
fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled to com-
parable constitutional protection." I d., at 1367. 
80--1417-0PINION 
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"incompetency" to make this decision under Massachusetts 
law. Id., at 1359--1362.4 Until a judicial finding of 
incompetency had been made, the court concluded, the 
wishes of the patients generally must be respected. I d., at 
1365--1368. Even when a state court had rendered a deter-
mination of incompetency, the District Court found that the 
patient's right to make treatment decisions was not forfeited, 
but must be exercised on his behalf by a court-appointed 
guardian. I d., at 1364. Without consent either by the pa-
tient or his guardian, the court held, the patient's liberty in-
terests could be overridden only in an emergency.5 
'Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse any medical treat-
ment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were ap-
plied to unauthorized touchings by a physician. See, e. g., Superintendent 
of Belchertown Hospital v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-739, 370 N. E. 
2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); W. Prosser, Torts § 18 (4th ed. 1971). In this 
case the ~Qfentiant;s had argued-as they continue to argue-that the judi-
cial committment proceedings conducted under Massachusetts law, Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 (1979), provided a determination of incompetency 
sufficient to warrant the State in providing treatment over the objections 
of the patient. In rejecting this argument as a matter of state law, the 
District Court relied principally on the language of the relevant Massachu-
setts statutes and on the regulations of the Department of Mental Health. 
See 478 F. Supp., at 1359, 1361 (citing Department of Mental Health Regu-
lation § 221.02 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to manages his 
affairs . . . solely by reason of his admission or commitment to a facility 
except where there has been an adjudication that such person is incompe-
tent"), and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, § 25 ("No person shall be 
deemed to be incompetent to manage his affairs ... solely by reason of his 
admission or commitment in any capacity .... "). The court also appears 
to have engaged in independent fact-finding leading to the same conclusion: 
"The weight of the evidence persuades this court that, although committed 
mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to 
reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that 
may reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic medication." 
478 F. Supp., at 1361. 
• The District Court defined an emergency as a situation in which failure 
to medicate "would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to the 
patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution." 478 F. 
80-1417-0PINION 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d 650 (1981). 
It agreed that mental patients had a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in deciding for themselves whether to un-
dergo treatment with antispychotic drugs. I d., at 653. 6 It 
also accepted the trial court's conclusion that Massachusetts 
law recognized even involuntarily committed persons as pre-
sumptively competent to assert this interest in their own be-
half. See id., at 657-659. The Court of Appeals reached 
different conclusions, however, as to the circumstances under 
which state interests might override the liberty interests of 
the patient. 
The Court of Appeals found that the State had two inter-
ests that must be weighed against the liberty interests as-
serted by the patient: a police power interest in maintaining 
order within the institution and in preventing violence, see 
634 F. 2d, at 655, and a parens patriae interest in alleviating 
the sufferings of mental illness and in providing clinically ef-
fective treatment, see 634 F. 2d, at 657. The court held that 
the State, under its police powers, could administer medica-
tion forcibly only upon a determination that "the need to pre-
vent violence in a particular situation outweighs the possibil-
ity of harm to the medicated individual" and that "reasonable 
Supp., at 1365. 
6 The Court of Appeals termed it "intuitively obvious" that "a person has 
a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide 
for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medi-
cal treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic 
drugs." 634 F. 2d, at 653. Although the Court of Appeals found that the 
"precise textual source in the Constitution for the protection of this inter-
ests is unclear," ibid., it concluded that "a source in the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution for the protection of this interest exists, most 
likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or per-
sonal security." Ibid. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to ex-
amine the conclusion of the District Court that First Amendment interests 
also were implicated. 
80-1417-0PINION 
MILLS v. ROGERS 5 
alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics [have 
been] ruled out." 634 F. 2d, at 656. Criticizing the District 
Court for imposing what it regarded as a more rigid stand-
ard, the Court of Appeals held that a hospital's professional 
staff must have substantial discretion in deciding when an im-
pending emergency required involuntary medication. 7 The 
Court of Appeals reserved to the District Court, on remand, 
the task of developing mechanisms to ensure that staff deci-
sions under the "police power" standard accorded adequate 
procedural protection to "the interests of the patients." 8 
With ~ga~ to the State's parens patriae powers, the 
Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's state law dis-
tinction between patients who had and patients who had not 
been adjudicated incompetent. Where a patient had not 
been found judicially to be "incompetent" to make treatment 
decisions under Massachusetts law, 9 the court ruled that the 
parens patriae interest would justify involuntary medication 
only when necessary to prevent further deterioration in the 
patient's mental health. See 634 F. 2d, at 660. The Court 
of Appeals reversed the District Court's conclusion that a 
guardian must be appointed to make non-emergency treat-
ment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. Even for 
incompetent patients, however, it ruled that the State's 
7 The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in requir-
ing what it construed as an overly simplistic mathematical calculation of 
the "quantitative" likelihood of harm. See 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
8 It asserted, apparently as a minimum, that "the determination that 
medication is necessary must be made by a qualified physician as to each 
individual patient to be medicated." 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
• A number of other States also distinguish between the standards gov-
erning involuntary commitment and those applying to determinations of 
incompetency to make treatment decisions. For a survey as of December 
1, 1977, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' 
Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 461, 504-525 (1977). Sev-
eral courts of appeals have held that civil commitment does not raise even a 
presumption of incompetence. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F. 2d 65 (CA2 
1971); Scott v. Plante, 532 F. 2d 939, 946 (CA3 1976). 
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parens patriae interest would justify prescription only of 
such treatment as would be accepted voluntarily by "the indi-
vidual himself . . . were he competent" to decide. I d., at 
661. 10 Procedurally, the Court of Appeals held that the pa- J 
tient's interest in avoiding undesired drug treatment gener-
ally must be protected by a judicial determination of 
"incompetency." 11 If such a determination were made, fur-
ther on-the-scene procedures still would be required before 
antipsychotic drugs could be administered forcibly in a par-
ticular instance. I d., at 661. 12 
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals involved 
constitutional issues of potentially broad significance, 13 we 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
10 In imposing this "substituted judgment" standard the Court of Appeals 
appears to have viewed its holding as mandated by the Federal Constitu-
tion. See ibid. ("In so holding, we do not imply that the Constitu-
tion .... ). But it followed its ultimate substantive conclusion with a cita-
tion to a Massachusetts case: "Cf. Superintendant of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz," 373 Mass. 728, 370 N. E. 2d 417 (1977). Saikewicz held that a 
court must apply the "substituted judgment" standard in determining 
whether to approve painful medical treatment for a profoundly retarded 
man incapable of giving informed consent. In Saikewicz the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court appears to have relied on both the Federal 
Constitution and the law of Massachusetts to support its decision. See id., 
at 738-738, 370 N. E. 2d, at 424--425. But the court characterized its anal-
ysis as having identified a "constitutional right of privacy," id., at 739, 370 
N. E . 2d, at 426, thus creating some doubt as to the extent that the deci-
sion had an independent state law basis. 
" The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with the District Court 
that this determination, under Massachusetts law, would require a decision 
by the probate court under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 § 25; see ch. 201 
§§ 1, 6, 12, 12 (appointment and powers of guardians). It suggested, how-
ever, that non-judicial procedures would satisfy the federal constitutional 
requirements of due process. See 634 F. 2d, at 659-660. 
12 The Court of Appeals again instructed the District Court to develop 
procedurals safeguards adequate to protect the patient's substantive inter-
ests. See 634 F. 2d, at 661. 
13 Constitutional questions involving the rights of committed mental pa-
tients to refuse antipsychotic drugs have been presented in other recent 
80-1417-0PINION 




The principal question on which we granted certiorari is 
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a 
constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 14 This question has both substantive and procedural 
aspects. See 634 F. 2d, at 656, 661; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 
2d 836, 841 (CA3 1981). The parties agree that the Constitu-
tion recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15 The substantive 
issue thus involves a definition of that protected constitu-
tional interest, as well as identification of the conditions 
under which competing state interests might outweigh it. 
Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113, at 147-154 (1973); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U. S. 11 (1905). The procedural issue concerns the mini-
mum procedures required by the Constitution for determin-
ing that the individual's liberty interest actually is out-
weighed in a particular instance. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 606 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 
335 (1976). 
As a practical matter both the substantive and procedural 
issues are intertwined with questions of state law. In the-
ory a court might be able to define the scope of a patient's 
federally protected liberty interest without reference to state 
cases, including Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (CA3 1980), and Davis v. 
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ohio 1980). On the issues raised, see gen-
erally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Con-
trol: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 237 (1974). 
"Pet. 1a. 
15 In this Court petitioners appear to concede the existence of a constitu-
tional interest in freedom from bodily invasion, see Brief for Petitioners at 
42-49, but they deny that this interest is "fundamental." They also assert 
that it is outweighed in an appropriate balancing test by compelling state 
interests in administering antipsychotic drugs. I d., at 54-68. 
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law. 16 Having done so, it then might proceed to adjudicate 
the procedural protection required by the due process clause 
for the federal interest alone. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 
480, 491-494 (1980). For purposes of determining actual 
rights and obligations, however, questions of state law can-
not be avoided. Within our federal system the substantive 
rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a 
mm1mum. State law may recognize liberty interests more 
extensive than those independently protected by the Federal 
Constitution. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 
442 U. S. 1, 7, 12 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 
(1975); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). If 
so, the broader state protections would define the actual sub-
stantive rights possessed by a person living within that 
State. The federal guarantees would not be "substantively" ~ 
controlling. 
Where a State creates liberty interests broader than those 
protected directly by the Federal Constitution, the proce-
dures mandated to protect the federal substantive interests 
also might fail to determine the actual procedural rights and 
duties of persons within the State. Because state-created 
liberty interests are entitled to the protection of the federal 
Due Process Clause, see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 488; 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, at 7, the full 
scope of a patient's due process rights may depend in part on 
the substantive liberty interests created by state as well as 
federal law. Moreover, a State may confer procedural pro-
tections of liberty interests that extend beyond those mini-
mally required by the Constitution of the United States. If 
~~/ 
16 s do the parties,jve assume for purposes of this discussion that invol-
un arily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected di-
rectly by the Constitution, cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 
(1975), and that these interests are implicated by the involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs. 
---
j,.._~ct~~ 
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a State does so, the minimal requirements of the Federal ~ 
Constitution would not be controlling, and ~d Het need.J&:; 
be identified in order to determine the legal rights and duties 
of persons within that State. 
B 
Roughly five months after the Court of Appeals decided 
this case, and shortly after this Court granted certiorari, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced its deci-
sion in In the Matter of Guardianship of Richard Roe, III , 
-Mass.-, 421 N. E. 2d 40 (1981) ("Roe III"). Roe III 
involved the right of a noninstitutionalized but mentally in-
competent person to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. Expressly resting its decision on the common law of 
Massachusetts as well as on the Federal Constitution, 17 
Massachusetts' highest court held in Roe III that a person 
has a protected liberty interest in "'decid[ing] for himself 
whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful 
medical treatment that is represented by the administration 
of antipsychotic drugs.'" --Mass., at --, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51 n. 9. 18 The court found-again apparently on the 
basis of the common law of Massachusetts as well as the Con-
stitution of the United States-that this interest of the indi-
vidual was of such importance that it could be overcome only 
" See- Mass., at-, 421 N. E . 2d, at 42 and n. 1, 51 n. 9. 
18 Although the Massachusetts court quoted this formulation from the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal in Mills v. Rogers, supra, 634 F . 2d, at 653, 
the quotation is used to define the right, rather than to identify its legal 
source. Roe III noted k hat Mills v. Rogers had found the source of this 
right in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court continued its discussion by stating its reliance on three bases, two of 
then not cited in Mills v. Rogers: the "inherent power of the court to pre-
vent mistakes or abuses by guardians, whose authority comes from the 
Commonwealth," and the "common law" right of persons to decide what 
will be done with their bodies. -Mass., at-, 420 N. E . 2d, at 51 
n. 9. 
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by "an overwhelming state interest." I d., at--, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51. Roe III further held that a person did not forfeit 
his protected liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompe-
tent, but rather remained entitled to have his "substituted 
judgment" exercised on his behalf. Ibid. Defining this 
"substituted judgment" as one for which "[n]o medical exper-
tise is required," id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 52, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court required a judicial determination of 
substituted judgment before drugs could be administered in a 
particular instance, 19 except possibly in cases of a medical 
emergency. 20 
--."""1 c 
~I the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that 
its decision was limited to cases involving noninstitutional-
ized mental patients. See-- Mass., at--; 420 N. E. 2d, 
at 42, 55, 61-62. 21 Nonetheless, respondents have argued in 
19 See ibid.: 
"The determination of what the incompetent individual would do if compe-
tent will probe the incompetent individual's values and preferences, and 
such an inquiry, in a case involving antipsychotic drugs [and a noninstitu-
tionalized but incompetent patient], is best made in courts of competent 
jurisdiction." 
Having held that "a ward possesses but is incapable of exercising person-
ally" the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court viewed the "primary dispute" as over "who ought to exercise this 
right on behalf of the ward." /d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51. The Su-
preme Judicial Court in Roe III identified six "relevant" but "not exclu-
sive" factors that should guide the decisions of the lower courts: "(1) the 
ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his religious beliefs; 
(3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of adverse side 
effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis 
with treatment." !d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 57. It emphasized that 
the determination "must 'give the fullest possible expression to the charac-
ter and circumstances'" of the individual patient and that "this is a subjec-
tive rather than an objective determination." /d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, 
at 56. 
20 See id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 54-55. 
21 But cf. id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 50 ("because of the likelihood of 
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this Court that Roe III may influence the correct disposition 
of the case at hand. 22 We agree. 
Especially in the wake of Roe III, it is distinctly possible 
that Massachusetts state law recognizes liberty interests of 
incompetent persons broader than those protected directly 
by the Constitution of the United States. Compare Roe III, 
supra, --Mass., at --, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 (protected lib-
erty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment continues even 
when a person becomes incompetent and creates a right of in-
competents to have their "substituted judgment" deter-
mined) with Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 429-430 
(1979) (because a person "who is suffering from a debilitating 
mental illness" is not "wholly at liberty," and because the 
complexities of psychiatric diagnosis "render certainties vir-
tually beyond reach," "practical considerations" may require 
"a compromise between what it is possible to prove and what 
protects the rights of the individual"). If the su s an we 
protection that the Constitution affords against the involun-
tary administration of antipsychotic drugs would not deter-
mine the actual substantive rights and duties of persons in 
the State of Massachusetts. 
Procedurally, it also is quite possible that a Massachusetts 
court, as a matter of state law, would require greater protec-
0 • 0 the necessity of making similar determinations in other cases, we es-
tablish guidelines regarding the criteria to be used and the procedures to 
be followed in making a substituted judgment determination"), and at 
-, 420 N. E . 2d, at 62 ("We do not mean to imply that these patients' 
rights are wholly unprotected or that their circumstances are entirely dis-
similar to those we have discussed. We do, suggest, however, that it 
would be imprudent to establish prematurely the relative importance of ad-
verse interests. 0 0 0 "). 
22 Respondents first presented this argument in a Motion to Dismiss or in 
the Alternative Certify Certain Questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, filed October 1, 1981. In their brief on the merits, re-
spondents argue that Roe III provides an alternative basis on which this 
Court could affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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tion of relevant liberty interests than the minimum adequate 
to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Compare 
Roe III, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 ("We 
have ... stated our preference for judicial resolution of cer-
tain legal issues arising from proposed extraordinary medical 
treatment .... ")with Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 
608 n. 16 (Courts must not "unduly burden[] the legitimate 
efforts of the States to deal with difficult social problems. 
The judicial model for fact-finding for all constitutionally pro-
tected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational 
decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise."). 23 Again 
on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of the proce-
dural rights and duties of the parties to this case. 
Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains un-
changed by Roe III, the federally mandated procedures will 
depend on the nature and weight of the state interests, as 
well as the individual interests, that are asserted. To iden-
tify the nature and scope of state interests that are to be bal-
anced against an individual's liberty interests, this Court fre-
quently has consulted state law. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113, 148 and n. 42, 151 and nn. 48-50 (1973); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 661-663 (1977). Here 
we view the underlying state law predicate for weighing as-
serted state interests as being put into doubt, if not altered, 
by Roe III. 24 
z• Even prior to Roe III, the Court of Appeals concluded that Massachu-
setts state Jaw, which it construed as requiring judicial determinations of 
incompetency separate from involuntary commitment proceedings, see 634 
F . 2d, at 6584i59, "in many respects ... goes well beyond the minimum 
requirements mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment," id., at 659. Roe 
I II now has taken the further step of requiring judicial procedure in every 
instance in which a guardian believes drug therapy necessary for a non-
institutionalized incompetent. 
"' In Roe III the Massachusetts court explicitly considered the implicated 
state interests, see- Mass., at-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 59, and concluded 
that the trial judge had erred in finding that the State had a "vital" parens 
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D 
It is unclear on the record presented whether respondents, 
in the District Court, did or did not argue the existence of 
"substantive" state law liberty interests as a basis for their 
claim to procedural protection relief under the federal Due 
Process Clause, or whether they may have claimed state law 
procedural protections for substantive federal interests. 25 In 
their brief in this Court, however, respondents clearly assert 
state law arguments as alternative grounds for affirming 
both the "substantive" and "procedural" decisions of the 
Court of Appeals. See Brief for Respondents, esp. at 61, 
71-72, 92-95. 
Until certain questions have been answered, we think it 
would be inappropriate for this Court to attempt to weigh or 
even to identify relevant liberty interests that might be de-
rived directly from the Constitution, independently of state 
law. It is this Court's settled policy to avoid unnecessary 
decisions of constitutional issues. See, e. g., City of Mes-
quite v. Aladdin's Castle,-- U. S. --, -- (1982); New 
York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583 
n. 22 (1979); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 
patriae interest in "seeing that its residents function at the maximum level 
of their capacity," ibid. The Court of Appeals in this case had found and 
weighed a parens patriae interest. 634 F. 2d, at 657-661. 
25 Although relying primarily on federal constitutional grounds, the re-
spondent's original complaint in the District Court could be construed as 
raising state law guarantees either as alternative or as interrelated bases 
for relief. See Complaint, No. 75-160-T (D. Mass.) (filed April25, 1975). 
In their briefs in the Court of Appeals, respondents relied unambiguously 
on state law in support of both the "substantive" and "procedural" rights 
that they now claim in this Court. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, No. 
79-1649, at 44 ("Massachusetts law created a legal entitlement to be free 
from forced medications except in emergencies .... "; Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellees, No. 79-1648, at 54 ("[T]he lower court's requirement that a 
guardian must decide whether an incompetent patient will receive psycho-
tropic medication in a non-emergency was the correct application of state 
law and was not based on constitutional authority.") (emphasis omitted). 
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U. S. 288, 347-348 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring). This 
policy is supported, although not always required, by the 
prohibition against advisory opinions. Cf. United States v. 
Hastings, 296 U. S. 188, 193 (1935) (review of one basis for a 
decision supported by another basis not subject to examina-
tion would represent "an expression of abstract opinion"). 
In applying this policy of restraint, we are uncertain here 
which if any constitutional issues now must be decided to re-
solve the controversy between the parties. In the wake of 
Roe III, we -e~a .JWt say with confidence that adjudication 
based solely on identification of federal constitutional inter-
ests would determine the actual rights and duties of the par-
ties before us. And, as an additional cause for hesitation, 
our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals has left us 
in doubt as to the extent to which state issues were argued 
below and the degree to which the court's holdings may rest 
on subsequently altered state law foundations. 
Because of its greater familiarity both with the record and 
with Massachusetts law, the Court of Appeals is better situ-
ated than we to determine how Roe III may have changed 
the law of Massachusetts and how any changes may affect 
this case. Accordingly, we think it appropriate for the 
Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance whether 
Roe III requires revision of its holdings or whether it may 
call for the certification of potentially dispositive state law 
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 150-151 (1976). 26 The 
Court of Appeals also may consider whether this is a case in 
which abstention now is appropriate. See generally Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
u. s. 800, 813--819 (1976). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated 
26 A certification procedure is provided by Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. 
Jud. Ct. Rule 1:03. 
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and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated~Y 1 O 1982 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
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MARK J. MILLS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
RUBIE ROGERS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Court granted certiorari in this case to determine 
whether involuntarily committed mental patients have a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 
I 
This litigation began on April 27, 1975, when respondent 
Rubie Rogers and six other persons filed suit against various 
officials and staff of the May and Austin Units of the Boston 
State Hospital. The plaintiffs all were present or former 
mental patients at the institution. During their period of in-
stitutionalization all had been forced to accept unwanted 
treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 1 Alleging that forcible 
1 As used in this litigation, the term "antipsychotic drugs" refers to 
medications such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin and Haldol that are used 
in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 
F. Supp. 1342, 1359-1360 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and reversed in 
part, 634 F. 2d 650, 653 (CAl 1980). Sometimes called "major tranquiliz-
ers," these compounds were introduced into psychiatry in the early 1950s. 
See Cole & Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs , in 2 A. Freeman, H. Kaplan, and 
B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry II, at 1921-1922 (2d ed. 
1975). It is not disputed that such drugs are "mind-altering." Their ef-
fectiveness resides in their capacity to achieve such effects. Citing au-
thorities, petitioners assert that such drugs are essential not only to the 
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administration of these drugs violated rights protected by the 
Constitution of the United States, the plaintiffs-respond-
ents here-sought compensatory and punitive damages and 
injunctive relief. 2 
The District Court certified the case as a class action. See 
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 n. 1 (D.Mass. 1979). 
Although denying relief in damages, the court held that men-
tal patients enjoy constitutionally protected liberty and pri-
vacy interests in deciding for themselves whether to submit 
to drug therapy. 3 The District Court found that an involun-
treatment of individual disorders, but also to the preservation of institu-
tional order generally needed for effective therapy. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 17-41, 54-100. Respondents dispute this claim, also with support 
from medical authorities. Respondents also emphasize that antipsychotic 
drugs carry a significant risk of adverse side effects. These include such 
neurological syndromes as parkinsonisms, characterized by mask-like face, 
retarded volitional movements, and tremors; akathisia, a clinical term for 
restlessness; dystonic reactions, including grimacing and muscle spasms; 
and tardive dyskinesia, a disease characterized in its mild form by involun-
tary muscle movements, especially around the mouth. Tardive dyskinesia 
can be even more disabling in its most severe forms. See Rogers v. Okin, 
supra, 478 F. Supp., at 1360; Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychi-
atric Disorders, in L. Goodman and A. Gilman, The Pharmalogical Basis of 
Therapeutics 169 (2d ed. 1975). 
' The respondents also presented constitutional and statutory challenges 
to a hospital policy of secluding patients against their will. 478 F . Supp. , 
at 1352. Their complaint additionally asserted claims for damages under 
state tort law. /d., at 1352, 1383. The District Court held that state law 
prevented seclusion except where necessary to prevent violence. See id., 
at 1371, 1374. Neither this decision, nor the denial of relief on the dam-
ages claims, is in issue before this Court. 
3 The District Court characterized liberty to make "the intimate decision 
whether to accept or refuse [antipsychotic] medication" as "basic to any 
right of privacy" and therefore protected by the Constitution. See 478 F. 
Supp., at 1366. The court did not derive this right from any particular 
constitutional provision, although it did observe that the "concept of a right 
of privacy .. . embodies First Amendment concerns." Ibid. In relying 
on the First Amendment the court reasoned that "the power to produce 
ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled 
to comparable constitutional protection." !d., at 1367. 
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tary "commitment" provides no basis for an inference of legal 
"incompetency" to make this decision under Massachusetts 
law. Id., at 1361-1362. 4 Until a judicial finding of 
incompetency has been made, the court concluded, the 
wishes of the patients generally must be respected. I d., at 
1365--1368. Even when a state court has rendered a deter-
mination of incompetency, the District Court found that the 
patient's right to make treatment decisions is not forfeited, 
but must be exercised on his behalf by a court-appointed 
guardian. I d., at 1364. Without consent either by the pa-
tient or his guardian, the court held, the patient's liberty in-
terests may be overridden only in an emergency.5 
'Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse any medical treat-
ment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were ap-
plied to unauthorized touchings by a physician. See, e. g., Superintendent 
of Belchertown Hospital v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-739, 370 N. E. 
2d 417, 424 (1977); W. Prosser, Torts § 18 (4th ed. 1971). In this case the 
petitioners had argued-as they continue to argue-that the judicial 
committment proceedings conducted under Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 123 (1979), provided a determination of incompetency suffi-
cient to warrant the State in providing treatment over the objections of the 
patient. In rejecting this argument as a matter of state law, the District 
Court relied principally on the language of the relevant Massachusetts 
statutes and on the regulations of the Department of Mental Health. See 
478 F. Supp., at 1359, 1361 (citing Department of Mental Health Regula-
tion § 221.02 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to manage his af-
fairs ... solely by reason of his admission or commitment to a facility ex-
cept where there has been an adjudication that such person is 
incompetent"), and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, § 25 ("No person shall 
be deemed to be incompetent to manage his affairs ... solely by reason of 
his admission or commitment in any capacity .... ")). The court also ap-
pears to have engaged in independent fact-finding leading to the same con-
clusion: "The weight of the evidence persuades this court that, although 
committed mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their rela-
tionship to reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and dis-
comfort that may reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic 
medication." 478 F. Supp., at 1361. 
5 The District Court defined an emergency as a situation in which failure 
to medicate "would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to 
th[e] patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution." 478 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d 650 (1980). 
It agreed that mental patients have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in deciding for themselves whether to un-
dergo treatment with antispychotic drugs. I d., at 653. 6 It 
also accepted the trial court's conclusion that Massachusetts 
law recognizes even involuntarily committed persons as pre-
sumptively competent to assert this interest on their own be-
half. See id., at 657-659. The Court of Appeals reached 
different conclusions, however, as to the circumstances under 
which state interests might override the liberty interests of 
the patient. 
The Court of Appeals found that the State has two inter-
ests that must be weighed against the liberty interests as-
serted by the patient: a police power interest in maintaining 
order within the institution and in preventing violence, see 
634 F. 2d, at 655, and a parens patriae interest in alleviating 
the sufferings of mental illness and in providing clinically ef-
fective treatment, see 634 F. 2d, at 657. The court held that 
the State, under its police powers, may administer medica-
tion forcibly only upon a determination that "the need to pre-
vent violence in a particular situation outweighs the possibil-
ity of harm to the medicated individual" and that "reasonable 
F. Supp., at 1365. 
• The Court of Appeals termed it "intuitively obvious" that "a person has 
a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide 
for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medi-
cal treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic 
drugs." 634 F. 2d, at 653. Although the Court of Appeals found that the 
"precise textual source in the Constitution for the protection of this inter-
ests is unclear," ibid., it concluded that "a source in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the protection of this interest ex-
ists, most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, 
or personal security." Ibid. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary 
to examine the conclusion of the District Court that First Amendment in-
terests also were implicated. 
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alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics [have 
been] ruled out." 634 F. 2d, at 656. Criticizing the District 
Court for imposing what it regarded as a more rigid stand-
ard, the Court of Appeals held that a hospital's professional 
staff must have substantial discretion in deciding when an im-
pending emergency requires involuntary medication. 7 The 
Court of Appeals reserved to the District Court, on remand, 
the task of developing mechanisms to ensure that staff deci-
sions under the "police power" standard accord adequate pro-
cedural protection to "the interests of the patients." 8 
With respect to the State's parens patriae powers, the 
Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's state law dis-
tinction between patients who have and patients who have 
not been adjudicated incompetent. Where a patient has not 
been found judicially to be "incompetent" to make treatment 
decisions under Massachusetts law,9 the court ruled that the 
parens patriae interest will justify involuntary medication 
only when necessary to prevent further deterioration in the 
patient's mental health. See 634 F. 2d, at 660. The Court 
of Appeals reversed the District Court's conclusion that a 
guardian must be appointed to make non-emergency treat-
ment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. Even for 
incompetent patients, however, it ruled that the State's 
7 The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in requir-
ing what it construed as an overly simplistic mathematical calculation of 
the "quantitative" likelihood of harm. See 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
8 It asserted, apparently as a minimum, that "the determination that 
medication is necessary must be made by a qualified physician as to each 
individual patient to be medicated." 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
9 A number of other States also distinguish between the standards gov-
erning involuntary commitment and those applying to determinations of 
incompetency to make treatment decisions. For a survey as of December 
1, 1977, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' 
Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 461, 504-525 (1977). The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that civil commitment 
does not raise even a presumption of incompetence. See Winters v. 
Miller, 446 F. 2d 65 (1971). 
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parens patriae interest would justify prescription only of 
such treatment as would be accepted voluntarily by "the indi-
vidual himself ... were he competent" to decide. Id., at 
661. 10 The Court of Appeals held that the patient's interest 
in avoiding undesired drug treatment generally must be pro-
tected procedurally by a judicial determination of 
"incompetency." 11 If such a determination were made, fur-
ther on-the-scene procedures still would be required before 
antipsychotic drugs could be administered forcibly in a par-
ticular instance. I d., at 661.12 
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals involved 
constitutional issues of potentially broad significance, 13 we 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
10 In imposing this "substituted judgment" standard the Court of Appeals 
appears to have viewed its holding as mandated by the Federal Constitu-
tion. See ibid. ("In so holding, we do not imply that the Constitu-
tion .... ). But it followed its ultimate substantive conclusion with a cita-
tion to a Massachusetts case: "Cf. Superintendant of Belchertown v. 
Saikewicz," 373 Mass. 728, 370 N. E. 2d 417 (1977). Saikewicz held that a 
court must apply the "substituted judgment" standard in determining 
whether to approve painful medical treatment for a profoundly retarded 
man incapable of giving informed consent. In Saikewicz the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court appears to have relied on both the Federal 
Constitution and the law of Massachusetts to support its decision. See id., 
at 73&-741, 370 N. E. 2d, at 424-425. But the court characterized its anal-
ysis as having identified a "constitutional right of privacy," id., at 739, 370 
N. E. 2d, at 426, thus creating some doubt as to the extent that the deci-
sion had an independent state law basis. 
"The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with the District Court 
that this determination, under Massachusetts law, would require a decision 
by the probate court under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 § 25; see ch. 201 
§§ 1, 6, 12, 12 (appointment and powers of guardians). It suggested, how-
ever, that non-judicial procedures would satisfy the federal constitutional 
requirements of due process. See 634 F. 2d, at 659-660. 
12 The Court of Appeals again instructed the District Court to develop 
procedurals safeguards adequate to protect the patient's substantive inter-
ests. See 634 F. 2d, at 661. 
13 Constitutional questions involving the rights of committed mental pa-
tients to refuse antipsychotic drugs have been presented in other recent 
80-1417-0PINION 




The principal question on which we granted certiorari is 
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 14 This question has both substantive and procedural 
aspects. See 634 F. 2d, at 656, 661; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 
2d 836, 841 (CA3 1980). The parties agree that the Constitu-
tion recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15 The substantive 
issue thus involves a definition of that protected constitu-
tional interest, as well as identification of the conditions 
under which competing state interests might outweigh it. 
Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. S. 113, 147-154 (1973); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U. S. 11, 2fr27(1905). The procedural issue concerns 
the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for 
determining that the individual's liberty interest actually is 
outweighed in a particular instance. See Parham v. J.R., 
442 U. S. 584, 606 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 
319, 335 (1976). 
As a practical matter both the substantive and procedural 
issues are intertwined with questions of state law. In the-
ory a court might be able to define the scope of a patient's 
cases, including Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (CA3 1980), and Davis v. 
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ohio 1980). On the issues raised, see gen-
erally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Con-
trol: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 237 (1974). 
"Pet. 1. 
15 In this Court petitioners appear to concede that involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients have a constitutional interest in freedom from bodily 
invasion, see Brief for Petitioners at 43-47, but they deny that this interest 
is "fundamental." They also assert that it is outweighed in an appropriate 
balancing test by compelling state interests in administering antipsychotic 
drugs. I d., at 54-68. 
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federally protected liberty interest without reference to state 
law. 16 Having done so, it then might proceed to adjudicate 
the procedural protection required by the Due Process 
Clause for the federal interest alone. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). For purposes of determining ac-
tual rights and obligations, however, questions of state law 
cannot be avoided. Within our federal system the substan-
tive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a 
mtrumum. State law may recognize liberty interests more 
extensive than those independently protected by the Federal 
Constitution. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 
442 U. S. 1, 7, 12 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 
(1975); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). If 
so, the broader state protections would define the actual sub-
stantive rights possessed by a person living within that 
State. 
Where a State creates liberty interests broader than those 
protected directly by the Federal Constitution, the proce-
dures mandated to protect the federal substantive interests 
also might fail to determine the actual procedural rights and 
duties of persons within the State. Because state-created 
liberty interests are entitled to the protection of the federal 
Due Process Clause, see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 488; 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, at 7, the full 
scope of a patient's due process rights may depend in part on 
the substantive liberty interests created by state as well as 
federal law. Moreover, a State may confer procedural pro-
tections of liberty interests that extend beyond those mini-
16 As do the parties, we assume for purposes of this discussion that invol-
untarily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected di-
rectly by the Constitution, cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 
(1975), and that these interests are implicated by the involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs. Only "assuming'' the existence of such in-
terests, we of course intimate no view as to the weight of such interests in 
comparison with possible countervailing state interests. 
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mally required by the Constitution of the United States. If 
a State does so, the minimal requirements of the Federal 
Constitution would not be controlling, and would not need to 
be identified in order to determine the legal rights and duties 
of persons within that State. 
B 
Roughly five months after the Court of Appeals decided 
this case, and shortly after this Court granted certiorari, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced its deci-
sion in In the Matter of Guardianship of Richard Roe, III, 
-Mass.-, 421 N. E. 2d 40 (1981) ("Roe III"). Roe III 
involved the right of a noninstitutionalized but mentally in-
competent person to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. Expressly resting its decision on the common law of 
Massachusetts as well as on the Federal Constitution, 17 
Massachusetts' highest court held in Roe III that a person 
has a protected liberty interest in "'decid[ing] for himself 
whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful 
medical treatment that is represented by the administration 
of antipsychotic drugs.'" --Mass., at --, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51 n. 9. 18 The court found-again apparently on the 
basis of the common law of Massachusetts as well as the Con-
stitution of the United States-that this interest of the indi-
vidual is of such importance that it can be overcome only by 
"See- Mass., at-, 421 N. E. 2d, at 42 and n. 1, 51 n. 9. 
18 Although the Massachusetts court quoted this formulation from the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal in Mills v. Rogers, supra, 634 F. 2d, at 653, 
the quotation is used to define the right, rather than to identify its legal 
source. Roe III noted that Mills v. Rogers found the source of this right 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court con-
tinued its discussion by stating its reliance on three bases, two of them not 
cited in Mills v. Rogers: the "inherent power of the court to prevent mis-
takes or abuses by guardians, whose authority comes from the Common-
wealth," and the "common law" right of persons to decide what will be done 
with their bodies. -Mass., at-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 n. 9. 
~I •• 
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"an overwhelming State interest." !d., at--, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51. Roe III further held that a person does not forfeit 
his protected liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompe-
tent, but rather remains entitled to have his "substituted 
judgment" exercised on his behalf. Ibid. Defining this 
"substituted judgment" as one for which "[n]o medical exper-
tise is required," id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 52, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court required a judicial deter-
mination of substituted judgment before drugs could be 
administered in a particular instance, 19 except possibly in 
cases of medical emergency. 20 
c 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that its decision 
was limited to cases involving noninstitutionalized mental 
patients. See-- Mass., at--; 420 N. E. 2d, at 42, 55, 
61-62. 21 Nonetheless, respondents have argued in this 
19 See i bid. : 
"The determination of what the incompetent individual would do if compe-
tent will probe the incompetent individual's values and preferences, and 
such an inquiry, in a case involving antipsychotic drugs [and a noninstitu-
tionalized but incompetent patient], is best made in courts of competent 
jurisdiction." 
Having held that a "ward possesses but is incapable of exercising person-
ally" the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court viewed the "primary dispute" as over "who ought to exercise this 
right on behalf of the ward." !d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51. The Su-
preme Judicial Court in Roe III identified six "relevant" but "not exclu-
sive" factors that should guide the decisions of the lower courts: "(1) the 
ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his religious beliefs; 
(3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of adverse side 
effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis 
with treatment." Id . , at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 57. It emphasized that 
the determination "must 'give the fullest possible expression to the charac-
ter and circumstances' " of the individual patient and that "this is a subjec-
tive rather than an objective determination." ld., at--, 420 N. E . 2d, 
at 56 (citation omitted). 
20 See i d. , at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 54-55. 
21 But cf. id. , at--, 420 N. E . 2d, at 50 ("because of the likelihood of 
,' 
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Court that Roe III may influence the correct disposition of 
the case at hand. 22 We agree. 
Especially in the wake of Roe III, it is distinctly possible 
that Massachusetts recognizes liberty interests of persons 
adjudged incompetent that are broader than those protected 
directly by the Constitution of the United States. Compare 
Roe III, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 (pro-
tected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment con-
tinues even when a person becomes incompetent and creates 
a right of incompetents to have their "substituted judgment" 
determined) with Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 
429-430 (1979) (because a person "who is suffering from a de-
bilitating mental illness" is not "wholly at liberty," and be-
cause the complexities of psychiatric diagnosis "render cer-
tainties virtually beyond reach," "practical considerations" 
may require "a compromise between what it is possible to 
prove and what protects the rights of the individual"). If the 
state interest is broader, the substantive protection that the 
Constitution affords against the involuntary administration 
of antipsychotic drugs would not determine the actual sub-
stantive rights and duties of persons in the State of 
Massachusetts. 
Procedurally, it also is quite possible that a Massachusetts 
court, as a matter of state law, would require greater protec-
... the necessity of making similar determinations in other cases, we es-
tablish guidelines regarding the criteria to be used and the procedures to 
be followed in making a substituted judgment determination"), and at 
--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 62 ("We do not mean to imply that these [involun-
tarily committed] patients' rights are wholly unprotected or that their cir-
cumstances are entirely dissimilar to those we have discussed. We do, 
suggest , however, that it would be imprudent to establish prematurely the 
relative importance of adverse interests . . . . "). 
"" Respondents first presented this argument in a Motion to Dismiss or in 
the Alternative Certify Certain Questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, filed in this Court on October 1, 1981. In their brief on the 
merits, respondents argue that Roe III provides an alternative basis on 
which this Court could affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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tion of relevant liberty interests than the minimum adequate 
to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Compare 
Roe III, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 ("We 
have ... stated our preference for judicial resolution of cer-
tain legal issues arising from proposed extraordinary medical 
treatment .... ")with Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 
608 n. 16 (Courts must not "unduly burden[] the legitimate 
efforts of the States to deal with difficult social problems. 
The judicial model for fact-finding for all constitutionally pro-
tected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational 
decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise."). 23 Again 
on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of the proce-
dural rights and duties of the parties to this case. 
Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains un-
changed by Roe III, the federally mandated procedures will 
depend on the nature and weight of the state interests, as 
well as the individual interests, that are asserted. To iden-
tify the nature and scope of state interests that are to be bal-
anced against an individual's liberty interests, this Court may 
look to state law. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 148 
and n. 42, 151 and nn. 48-50 (1973); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S. 651, 661-663 (1977). Here we view the underlying 
state law predicate for weighing asserted state interests as 
being put into doubt, if not altered, by Roe III.'lA 
23 Even prior to Roe III, the Court of Appeals concluded that Massachu-
setts state law, which it construed as requiring judicial determinations of 
incompetency separate from involuntary commitment proceedings, see 634 
F. 2d, at 658--659, "in many respects ... goes well beyond the minimum 
requirements mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment," id., at 659 (foot-
note omitted). Roe III now has taken the further step of requiring judi-
cial procedure in every instance in which a guardian believes drug therapy 
necessary for a noninstitutionalized incompetent. 
24 In Roe III the Massachusetts court explicitly considered the implicated 
state interests, see-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 59, and concluded 
that the trial judge had erred in finding that the State had a "vital" parens 
patriae interest in "seeing that its residents function at the maximum level 
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D 
It is unclear on the record presented whether respondents, 
in the District Court, did or did not argue the existence of 
"substantive" state law liberty interests as a basis for their 
claim to procedural protection relief under the federal Due 
Process Clause, or whether they may have claimed state law 
procedural protections for substantive federal interests. 25 In 
their brief in this Court, however, respondents clearly assert 
state law arguments as alternative grounds for affirming 
both the "substantive" and "procedural" decisions of the 
Court of Appeals. See Brief for Respondents, esp. at 61, 
71-72, 92-95. 
Until certain questions have been answered, we think it 
would be inappropriate for us to attempt to weigh or even to 
identify relevant liberty interests that might be derived di-
rectly from the Constitution, independently of state law. It 
is this Court's settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of 
constitutional issues. See, e. g., City of Mesquite v. Alad-
din's Castle,-- U. S. --,-- (1982); New York Transit 
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583 n. 22 (1979); 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 502-509 (1961); Ashwander v. 
of their capacity," ibid. The Court of Appeals in this case had found and 
weighed a parens patriae interest. 634 F. 2d, at 657-661. 
z.s Although relying primarily on federal constitutional grounds, the re-
spondent's original complaint in the District Court could be construed as 
raising state law guarantees either as alternative or as interrelated bases 
for relief. See Complaint, No. 7fr.160-T (D. Mass.) (filed April 27, 1975). 
In their briefs in the Court of Appeals, respondents relied unambiguously 
on state law in support of both the "substantive" and "procedural" rights 
that they now claim in this Court. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, No. 
79-1649, at 44 ("Massachusetts law created a legal entitlement to be free 
from forced medications except in emergencies . ... "; Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellees, No. 79-1648, at 54 ("[T]he lower court's requirement that a 
guardian must decide whether an incompetent patient will receive psycho-
tropic medication in a non-emergency was the correct application of state 
law and was not based upon constitutional authority. ") (emphasis omitted). 
80-1417-0PINION 
14 MILLS v. ROGERS 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 347-348 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This policy is supported, 
although not always required, by the prohibition against ad-
visory opmwns. Cf. United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 
188, 193 (1935) (review of one basis for a decision supported 
by another basis not subject to examination would represent 
"an expression of abstract opinion"). 
In applying this policy of restraint, we are uncertain here 
which if any constitutional issues now must be decided to re-
solve the controversy between the parties. In the wake of 
Roe III, we cannot say with confidence that adjudication 
based solely on identification of federal constitutional inter-
ests would determine the actual rights and duties of the par-
ties before us. And, as an additional cause for hesitation, 
our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals has left us 
in doubt as to the extent to which state issues were argued 
below and the degree to which the court's holdings may rest 
on subsequently altered state law foundations. 
Because of its greater familiarity both with the record and 
with Massachusetts law, the Court of Appeals is better situ-
ated than we to determine how Roe III may have changed 
the law of Massachusetts and how any changes may affect 
this case. Accordingly, we think it appropriate for the 
Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance whether 
Roe III requires revision of its holdings or whether it may 
call for the certification of potentially dispositive state law 
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 150-151 (1976). 26 The 
Court of Appeals also may consider whether this is a case in 
which abstention now is appropriate. See generally Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
u. s. 800, 813-819 (1976). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated 
26 A certification procedure is provided by Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. 
Jud. Ct. Rule 1:03. 
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and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1417 
MARK J. MILLS ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
RUBIE ROGERS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT .., 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Court granted certiorari in this case to determine 
whether involuntarily committed mental patients have a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 
I 
This litigation began on April 27, 1975, when respondent 
Rubie Rogers and six other persons filed suit against various 
officials and staff of the May and Austin Units of the Boston 
State Hospital. The plaintiffs all were present or former 
mental patients at the institution. During their period of in-
stitutionalization all had been forced to accept unwanted 
treatment with antipsychotic drugs.' Alleging that forcible 
' As used in this litigation, the term "antipsychotic drugs" refers to 
medications such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin and Haldol that are used 
in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 
F. Supp. 1342, 1359-1360 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part and reversed in 
part, 634 F. 2d 650, 653 (CA11980). Sometimes called "major tranquiliz-
ers," these compounds were introduced into psychiatry in the early 1950s. 
See Cole & Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 2 A. Freeman, H. Kaplan, and 
B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry II , at 1921-1922 (2d ed. 
1975). It is not disputed that such drugs are "mind-altering." Their ef-
fectiveness resides in their capacity to achieve such effects. Citing au-
thorities , petitioners assert that such drugs are essential not only to the 
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administration of these drugs violated rights protected by the 
Constitution of the United States, the plaintiffs-respond-
ents here-sought compensatory and punitive damages and 
injunctive relief. 2 
The District Court certified the case as a class action. See 
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 n. 1 (D.Mass. 1979). 
Although denying relief in damages, the court held that men-
tal patients enjoy constitutionally protected liberty and pri-
vacy interests in deciding for themselves whether to submit 
to drug therapy. 3 The District Court found that an involun-
treatment of individual disorders, but also to the preservation of institu-
tional order generally needed for effective therapy. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 17-41, 54-100. Respondents dispute this claim, also with support 
from medical authorities. Respondents also emphasize that antipsychotic 
drugs carry a significant risk of adverse side effects. These include such 
neurological syndromes as parkinsonisms, characterized by mask-like face, 
retarded volitional movements, and tremors; akathisia, a clinical term for 
restlessnes~ dystonic reactions, including grimacing and muscle spasms; 
and tardive 'dyskinesia, a disease characterized in its mild form by involun-
tary muscle movements, especially around the mouth. Tardive dyskinesia 
can be even more disabling in its most severe forms. See Rogers v. Okin, 
supra, 478 F. Supp., at 1360; Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychi-
atric Disorders, in L. Goodman and A. Gilman, The Pharmalogical Basis of 
Therapeutics 169 (2d ed. 1975). 
2 The respondents also presented constitutional and statutory challenges 
to a hospital policy of secluding patients against their will. 4 78 F. Supp., 
at 1352. Their complaint additionally asserted claims for damages under 
state tort law. Id., at 1352, 1383. The District Court held that state law 
prevented seclusion except where necessary to prevent violence. See id., 
at 1371, 1374. Neither this decision, nor the denial of relief on the dam-
ages claims, is in issue before this Court. 
3 The District Court characterized liberty to make "the intimate decision 
whether to accept or refuse [antipsychotic] medication" as "basic to any 
right of privacy" and therefore protected by the Constitution. See 478 F. 
Supp., at 1366. The court did not derive this right from any particular 
constitutional provision, although it did observe that the "concept of a right 
of privacy ... embodies First Amendment concerns." Ibid. In relying 
on the First Amendment the court reasoned that "the power to produce 
ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled 
to comparable constitutional protection." I d., at 1367. 
, .. 
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tary "commitment" provides no basis for an inference of legal 
"incompetency" to make this decision under Massachusetts 
law. Id., at 1361-1362.4 Until a judicial finding of 
incompetency has been made, the court concluded, the 
wishes of the patients generally must be respected. I d., at 
1365-1368. Even when a state court has rendered a deter-
mination of incompetency, the District Court found that the 
patient's right to make treatment decisions is not forfeited, 
but must be exercised on his behalf by a court-appointed 
guardian. I d., at 1364. Without consent either by the pa-
tient or his guardian, the court held, the patient's liberty in-
terests may be overridden only in an emergency. 5 
'Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse any medical treat-
ment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were ap-
plied to unauthorized touchings by a physician. See, e. g., Superintendent 
of Belchertown Hospital v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738--739, 370 N. E. 
2d 417, 424 (1977); W. Prosser, Torts§ 18 (4th ed. 1971). In this case the 
petitioners had argued-as they continue to argue-that the judicial 
committment proceedings conducted under Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 123 (1979), provided a determination of incompetency suffi-
cient to warrant the State in providing treatment over the objections of the 
patient. In rejecting this argument as a matter of state law, the District 
Court relied principally on the language of the relevant Massachusetts 
statutes and on the regulations of the Department of Mental Health. See 
478 F. Supp., at 1359, 1361 (citing Department of Mental Health Regula-
tion § 221.02 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to manage his af-
fairs .. . solely by reason of his admission or commitment to a facility ex-
cept where there has been an adjudication that such person is 
incompetent"), and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, § 25 ("No person shall 
be deemed to be incompetent to manage his affairs . . . solely by reason of 
his admission or commitment in any capacity .. . . ")). The court also ap-
pears to have engaged in independent fact-finding leading to the same con-
clusion: "The weight of the evidence persuades this court that, although 
committed mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their rela-
tionship to reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and dis-
comfort that may reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic 
medication." 478 F. Supp., at 1361. 
5 The District Court defined an emergency as a situation in which failure 
to medicate "would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to 
th[e] patient, other patients, or to staff members of the institution." 478 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d 650 (1980). 
It agreed that mental patients have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in deciding for themselves whether to un-
dergo treatment with antispychotic drugs. I d., at 653. 6 It 
also accepted the trial court's conclusion that Massachusetts 
law recognizes even involuntarily committed persons as pre-
sumptively competent to assert this interest on their own be-
half. See id., at 657-659. The Court of Appeals reached 
different conclusions, however, as to the circumstances under 
which state interests might override the liberty interests of 
the patient. 
The Court of Appeals found that the State has two inter-
ests that must be weighed against the liberty interests as-
serted by the patient: a police power interest in maintaining 
order within the institution and in preventing violence, see 
634 F. 2d, at 655, and a parens patriae interest in alleviating 
the sufferings of mental illness and in providing clinically ef-
fective treatment, see 634 F. 2d, at 657. The court held that 
the State, under its police powers, may administer medica-
tion forcibly only upon a determination that "the need to pre-
vent violence in a particular situation outweighs the possibil-
ity of harm to the medicated individual" and that "reasonable 
F. Supp., at 1365. 
• The Court of Appeals termed it "intuitively obvious" that "a person has 
a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide 
for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medi-
cal treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic 
drugs." 634 F. 2d, at 653. Although the Court of Appeals found that the 
"precise textual source in the Constitution for the protection of this inter-
ests is unclear," ibid., it concluded that "a source in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the protection of this interest ex-
ists, most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, 
or personal security." Ibid. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary 
to examine the conclusion of the District Court that First Amendment in-
terests also were implicated. 
.... 
80-1417-0PINION 
MILLS v. ROGERS 5 
alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics [have 
been] ruled out." 634 F. 2d, at 656. Criticizing the District 
Court for imposing what it regarded as a more rigid stand-
ard, the Court of Appeals held that a hospital's professional 
staff must have substantial discretion in deciding when an im-
pending emergency requires involuntary medication. 7 The 
Court of Appeals reserved to the District Court, on remand, 
the task of developing mechanisms to ensure that staff deci-
sions under the "police power" standard accord adequate pro-
cedural protection to "the interests of the patients." 8 
With respect to the State's parens patriae powers, the 
Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's state law dis-
tinction between patients who have and patients who have 
not been adjudicated incompetent. Where a patient has not 
been found judicially to be "incompetent" to make treatment 
decisions under Massachusetts law,9 the court ruled that the 
parens patriae interest will justify involuntary medication 
only when necessary to prevent further deterioration in the 
patient's mental health. See 634 F. 2d, at 660. The Court 
of Appeals reversed the District Court's conclusion that a 
guardian must be appointed to make non-emergency treat-
ment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. Even for 
incompetent patients, however, it ruled that the State's 
7 The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in requir-
ing what it construed as an overly simplistic mathematical calculation of 
the "quantitative" likelihood of harm. See 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
8 It asserted, apparently as a minimum, that "the determination that 
medication is necessary must be made by a qualified physician as to each 
individual patient to be medicated." 634 F. 2d, at 656. 
9 A number of other States also distinguish between the standards gov-
erning involuntary commitment and those applying to determinations of 
incompetency to make treatment decisions. For a survey as of December 
1, 1977, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' 
Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 461, 504-525 (1977). The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that civil commitment 
does not raise even a presumption of incompetence. See Winters v. 
Miller, 446 F. 2d 65 (1971) . 
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parens patriae interest would justify prescription only of 
such treatment as would be accepted voluntarily by "the indi-
vidual himself . . . were he competent" to decide. I d., at 
661. 10 The Court of Appeals held that the patient's interest 
in avoiding undesired drug treatment generally must be pro-
tected procedurally by a judicial determination of 
"incompetency." 11 If such a determination were made, fur-
ther on-the-scene procedures still would be required before 
antipsychotic drugs could be administered forcibly in a par-
ticular instance. Id., at 661. 12 
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals involved 
constitutional issues of potentially broad significance, 13 we 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
10 In imposing this "substituted judgment" standard the Court of Appeals 
appears to have viewed its holding as mandated by the Federal Constitu-
tion. See ibid. ("In so holding, we do not imply that the Constitution . 
. . . ). But it followed its ultimate substantive conclusion with a citation to 
a Massachusetts case: "Cf. Superintendant of Belchertown v. Saikewicz," 
373 Mass. 728, 370 N. E. 2d 417 (1977). Saikewicz held that a court must 
apply the "substituted judgment" standard in determining whether to ap-
prove painful medical treatment for a profoundly retarded man incapable of 
giving informed consent. In Saikewicz the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court appears to have relied on both the Federal Constitution and the 
law of Massachusetts to support its decision. See id., at 738-741, 370 N. 
E. 2d, at 424-425. But the court characterized itF analysis as having iden-
tified a "constitutional right of privacy," id., at 739, 370 N. E. 2d, at 426, 
thus creating some doubt as to the extent that the decision had an inde-
pendent state law basis. 
11 The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with the District Court 
that this determination, under Massachusetts law, would require a decision 
by the probate court under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123 § 25; see ch. 201 
§§ 1, 6, 12, 12 (appointment and powers of guardians). It suggested, how-
ever, that non-judicial procedures would satisfy the federal constitutional 
requirements of due process. See 634 F. 2d, at 65~60. 
12 The Court of Appeals again instructed the District Court to develop 
procedurals safeguards adequate to protect the patient's substantive inter-
ests. See 634 F. 2d, at 661. 
13 Constitutional questions involving the rights of committed mental pa-
tients to refuse antipsychotic drugs have been presented in other recent 
~ . . 
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The principal question on which we granted certiorari is 
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 14 This question has both substantive and procedural 
aspects. See 634 F. 2d, at 656, 661; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 
2d 836, 841 (CA3 1980). The parties agree that the Constitu-
tion recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15 Assuming that l 
they are correct in this respect, the substantive issue in-
volves a definition of that protected constitutional interest, as 
well as identification of the conditions under which competing 
state interests might outweigh it. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 147-154 
(1973); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 
25-27(1905). The procedural issue concerns the minimum 
procedures required by the Constitution for determining that 
the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a 
particular instance. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 606 
(1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). 
As a practical matter both the substantive and procedural 
issues are intertwined with questions of state law. In the-
ory a court mi1 ;ht be able to define the scope of a patient's 
cases, including Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (CA3 1980), and Davis v. 
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ohio 1980). On the issues raised, see gen-
erally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Con-
trol: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 237 (1974). 
14 Pet. 1. 
15 In this Court petitioners appear to concede that involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients have a constitutional interest in freedom from bodily 
invasion, see Brief for Petitioners at 43--47, but they deny that this interest 
is "fundamental." They also assert that it is outweighed in an appropriate 
balancing test by compelling state interests in administering antipsychotic 
drugs. I d., at 54-68. 
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federally protected liberty interest without reference to state 
law. 16 Having done so, it then might proceed to adjudicate 
the procedural protection required by the Due Process 
Clause for the federal interest alone. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). For purposes of determining ac-
tual rights and obligations, however, questions of state law 
cannot be avoided. Within our federal system the substan-
tive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a 
Inlmmum. State law may recognize liberty interests more 
extensive than those independently protected by the Federal 
Constitution. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 
442 U. S. 1, 7, 12 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 
(1975); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). If 
so, the broader state protections would define the actual sub-
stantive rights possessed by a person living within that 
State. 
Where a State creates liberty interests broader than those 
protected directly by the Federal Constitution, the proce-
dures mandated to protect the federal substantive interests 
also might fail to determine the actual procedural rights and 
duties of persons within the State. Because state-created 
liberty interests are entitled to the protection of the federal 
Due Process Clause, see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 488; 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, at 7, the full 
scope of a patient's due process rights may depend in part on 
the substantive liberty interests created by state as well as 
federal law. Moreover, a State may confer procedural pro-
tections of liberty interests that extend beyond those mini-
16 As do the parties, we assume for purposes of this discussion that invol-
untarily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected di-
rectly by the Constitution, cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 
(1975), and that these interests are implicated by the involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs. Only "assuming" the existence of such in-
terests, we of course intimate no view as to the weight of such interests in 
comparison with possible countervailing state interests. 
' ' 
80-1417-0PINION 
MILLS v. ROGERS 9 
mally required by the Constitution of the United States. If 
a State does so, the minimal requirements of the Federal 
Constitution would not be controlling, and would not need to 
be identified in order to determine the legal rights and duties 
of persons within that State. 
B 
Roughly five months after the Court of Appeals decided 
this case, and shortly after this Court granted certiorari, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced its deci-
sion in In the Matter of Guardianship of Richard Roe, III, 
-Mass.-, 421 N. E. 2d 40 (1981) ("Roe III"). Roe III 
involved the right of a noninstitutionalized but mentally in-
competent person to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. Expressly resting its decision on the common law of 
Massachusetts as well as on the Federal Constitution, 17 
Massachusetts' highest court held in Roe III that a person 
has a protected liberty interest in "'decid[ing] for himself 
whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful 
medical treatment that is represented by the administration 
of antipsychotic drugs.'" --Mass., at --, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51 n. 9. 18 The court found-again apparently on the 
basis of the common law of Massachusetts as well as the Con-
stitution of the United States-that this interest of the indi-
vidual is of such importance that it can be overcome only by 
'
7 See- Mass., at-, 421 N. E. 2d, at 42 and n. 1, 51, n. 9. 
18 Although the Massachusetts court quoted this formulation from the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal in Mills v. Rogers, supra, 634 F. 2d, at 653, 
the quotation is used to define the right, rather than to identify its legal 
source. Roe III noted that Mills v. Rogers found the source of this right 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court con-
tinued its discussion by stating its reliance on three bases, two of them not 
cited in Mills v. Rogers: the "inherent power of the court to prevent mis-
takes or abuses by guardians, whose authority comes from the Common-
wealth," and the "common law" right of persons to decide what will be done 
with their bodies. -Mass., at-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51, n. 9. 
80-1417-0PINION 
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"an overwhelming State interest." Id., at--, 420 N. E. 
2d, at 51. Roe III further held that a person does not forfeit 
his protected liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompe-
tent, but rather remains entitled to have his "substituted 
judgment" exercised on his behalf. Ibid. Defining this 
"substituted judgment" as one for which "[n]o medical exper-
tise is required," id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 52, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court required a judicial deter-
mination of substituted judgment before drugs could be 
administered in a particular instance, 19 except possibly in 
cases of medical emergency. 20 
c 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that its decision 
was limited to cases involving noninstitutionalized mental 
patients. See-- Mass., at--; 420 N. E. 2d, at 42, 55, 
61-62.21 Nonetheless, respondents have argued in this 
19 See ibid. : 
"The determination of what the incompetent individual would do if compe-
tent will probe the incompetent individual's values and preferences, and 
such an inquiry, in a case involving antipsychotic drugs [and a noninstitu-
tionalized but incompetent patient], is best made in courts of competent 
jurisdiction." 
Having held that a "ward possesses but is incapable of exercising person-
ally" the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court viewed the "primary dispute" as over "who ought to exercise this 
right on behalf of the ward." I d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51. The Su-
preme Judicial Court in Roe III identified six "relevant" but "not exclu-
sive" factors that should guide the decisions of the lower courts: "(1) the 
ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his religious beliefs; 
(3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of adverse side 
effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis 
with treatment." Id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 57. It emphasized that 
the determination "must 'give the fullest possible expression to the charac-
ter and circumstances'" of the individual patient and that "this is a subjec-
tive rather than an objective determination." I d., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, 
at 56 (citation omitted). 
20 See id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 54-55. 
21 But cf. id., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 50 ("because of the likelihood of 
80-1417-0PINION 
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Court that Roe III may influence the correct disposition of 
the case at hand. 22 We agree. 
Especially in the wake of Roe III, it is distinctly possible 
that Massachusetts recognizes liberty interests of persons 
adjudged incompetent that are broader than those protected 
directly by the Constitution of the United States. Compare 
Roe III, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 (pro-
tected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment con-
tinues even when a person becomes incompetent and creates 
a right of incompetents to have their "substituted judgment" 
determined) with Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 
429-430 (1979) (because a person "who is suffering from a de-
bilitating mental illness" is not "wholly at liberty," and be-
cause the complexities of psychiatric diagnosis "render cer-
tainties virtually beyond reach," "practical considerations" 
may require "a compromise between what it is possible to 
prove and what protects the rights of the individual"). If the 
state interest is broader, the substantive protection that the 
Constitution affords against the involuntary administration 
of antipsychotic drugs would not determine the actual sub-
stantive rights and duties of persons in the State of 
Massachusetts. 
Procedurally, it also is quite possible that a Massachusetts 
court, as a matter of state law, would require greater protec-
... the necessity of making similar determinations in other cases, we es-
tablish guidelines regarding the criteria to be used and the procedures to 
be followed in making a substituted judgment determination"), and at 
-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 62 ("We do not mean to imply that these [involun-
tarily committed] patients' rights are wholly unprotected or that their cir-
cumstances are entirely dissimilar to those we have discussed. We do, 
suggest, however, that it would be imprudent to establish prematurely the 
relative importance of adverse interests .... "). 
22 Respondents first presented this argument in a Motion to Dismiss or in 
the Alternative Certify Certain Questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, filed in this Court on October 1, 1981. In their brief on the 
merits, respondents argue that Roe III provides an alternative basis on 
which this Court could affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
S<J-1417-0PINION 
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tion of relevant liberty interests than the minimum adequate 
to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Compare 
Roe III, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 ("We 
have . . . stated our preference for judicial resolution of cer-
tain legal issues arising from proposed extraordinary medical 
treatment .... ")with Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 
608 n. 16 (Courts must not "unduly burden[] the legitimate 
efforts of the States to deal with difficult social problems. 
The judicial model for fact-finding for all constitutionally pro-
tected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational 
decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise."). 23 Again 
on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of the proce-
dural rights and duties of the parties to this case. 
Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains un-
changed by Roe III, the federally mandated procedures will 
depend on the nature and weight of the state interests, as 
well as the individual interests, that are asserted. To iden-
tify the nature and scope of state interests that are to be bal-
anced against an individual's liberty interest~ this Court may 
look to state law. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 148 
and n. 42, 151 and nn. 48-50 (1973); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S. 651, 661-663 (1977). Here we view the underlying 
state law predicate for weighing asserted state interests as 
being put into doubt, if not altered, by Roe III. 24 
Zl Even prior to Roe III, the Court of Appeals concluded that Massachu-
setts state law, which it construed as requiring judicial detenninations of 
incompetency separate from involuntary commitment proceedings, see 634 
F. 2d, at 658-659, "in many respects . .. goes well beyond the minimum 
requirements mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment," id., at 659 (foot-
note omitted). Roe III now has taken the further step of requiring judi-
cial procedure in every instance in which a guardian believes drug therapy 
necessary for a noninstitutionalized incompetent. 
24 In Roe III the Massachusetts court explicitly considered the implicated 
state interests, see- Mass., at-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 59, and concluded 
that the trial judge had erred in finding that the State had a "vital" parens 
patriae interest in "seeing that its residents function at the maximum level 
8(}.-1417-0PINION 
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D 
It is unclear on the record presented whether respondents, 
in the District Court, did or did not argue the existence of 
"substantive" state law liberty interests as a basis for their 
claim to procedural protection relief under the federal Due 
Process Clause, or whether they may have claimed state law 
procedural protections for substantive federal interests. 25 In 
their brief in this Court, however, respondents clearly assert 
state law arguments as alternative grounds for affirming 
both the "substantive" and "procedural" decisions of the 
Court of Appeals. See Brief for Respondents, esp. at 61, 
71-72, 92-95. 
Until certain questions have been answered, we think it 
would be inappropriate for us to attempt to weigh or even to 
identify relevant liberty interests that might be derived di-
rectly from the Constitution, independently of state law. It 
is this Court's settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of 
constitutional issues. See, e. g., City of Mesquite v. Alad-
din's Castle,-- U. S. --, -- (1982); New York Transit 
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583 n. 22 (1979); 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 502-509 (1961); Ashwander v. 
of their capacity," ibid. The Court of Appeals in this case had found and 
weighed a parens patriae interest. 634 F. 2d, at 657-Q61. 
25 Although relying primarily on federal constitutional grounds, the re-
spondent's original complaint in the District Court could be construed as 
raising state law guarantees either as alternative or as interrelated bases 
for relief. See Complaint, No. 75-16(}.-T (D. Mass.) (filed April27, 1975). 
In their briefs in the Court of Appeals, respondents relied unambiguously 
on state law in support of both the "substantive" and "procedural" rights 
that they now claim in this Court. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, No. 
79-1649, at 44 ("Massachusetts law created a legal entitlement to be free 
from forced medications except in emergencies .... "; Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellees, No. 79-1648, at 54 ("[T]he lower court's requirement that a 
guardian must decide whether an incompetent patient will receive psycho-
tropic medication in a non-emergency was the correct application of state 
law and was not based upon constitutional authority.") (emphasis omitted). 
80-1417-0PINION 
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Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 347-348 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This policy is supported, 
although not always required, by the prohibition against ad-
visory opm10ns. Cf. United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 
188, 193 (1935) (review of one basis for a decision supported 
by another basis not subject to examination would represent 
"an expression of abstract opinion"). 
In applying this policy of restraint, we are uncertain here 
which if any constitutional issues now must be decided to re-
solve the controversy between the parties. In the wake of 
Roe III, we cannot say with confidence that adjudication 
based solely on identification of federal constitutional inter-
ests would determine the actual rights and duties of the par-
ties before us. And, as an additional cause for hesitation, 
our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals has left us 
in doubt as to the extent to which state issues were argued 
below and the degree to which the court's holdings may rest 
on subsequently altered state law foundations. 
Because of its greater familiarity both with the record and 
with Massachusetts law, the Court of Appeals is better situ-
ated than we to determine how Roe III may have changed 
the law of Massachusetts and how any changes may affect 
this case. Accordingly, we think it appropriate for the 
Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance whether 
Roe III requires revision of its holdings or whether it may 
call for the certification of potentially dispositive state law 
questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 150-151 (1976). 26 The 
Court of Appeals also may consider whether this is a case in 
which abstention now is appropriate. See generally Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
u. s. 800, 813-819 (1976). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated 
26 A certification procedure is provided by Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. 
Jud. Ct. Rule 1:03. 
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and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
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June 10, 1982 J U S TI CE HARRY A . B L A CKM U N 
Re: No. 80-1417 - Mills v. Rogers 
Dear Lewis: 
I am somewhat uneasy about this one. We really are not 
deciding anything despite the ·fact that after Roe III there 
is no controversy, under Massachusetts law, that an involun-
tarily committed person is not incompetent to make a treat-
ment decision until he is actually adjudged incompetent. On 
this issue, nothing is to be accomplished by the remand. I 
do not feel strongly enough, however, to write separately 
and thus shall give you one of Charlie Whittaker's "grave-
yard dissents." 
Rennie v. Klein, which you cite on page 7, is a hold 
for this case on a pending cert. I suppose, but of course 
do not know, that we shall grant it and start all over 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Dear Lewis: 
.h}trmu ~ltttrl ttf tltt ~b ~hd.ttt 
.tutfrittgbttt. ~. ~· 2!Tgi,.., 
Re: No. 80-1417 - Mills v. Rogers 
June 15, 1982 
I did not mean to be "funny," but my "graveyard 
dissent" in my note of June 10 was a reluctant joinder. 
At least, that is what I have assumed for some years to 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
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June 16, 1982 
Memorandum to the Conference 
No. 80-1417, Mills v. Rogers 
As this case will "come down" on the same date as No. 
80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo, I think it desirable for there 
to be some cross-citation between the cases. I now propose 
to cite Youngberg on pages 7 and 12 of my most recent 
(second) draft in this case. The attached xerox copies have 




Youngberg v. Romeo, ante, at 15 
(
11 [T]here certainly is no reason 
to think judges or juries are 
better qualified than appropriate 
professionals in making 
[treatment] decisions."), and 
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tion of relevant liberty interests than the minimum adequate 
to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Compare 
Roe Ill, supra,-- Mass., at--, 420 N. E. 2d, at 51 ("We 
have . . . stated our preference for judicial resolution of cer-
tain legal issues arising from ro osed extraordinary medical 
treatment .... ") with arham v. J .R., supra, 
608 n. 16 (Courts mus not "unduly burden[] the legitimate 
efforts of the States to deal with difficult social problems. 
The judicial model for fact-finding for all constitutionally pro-
tected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational 
decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise."). 23 Again 
on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of the proce-
dural rights and duties of the parties to this case. 
Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains un-
changed by Roe Ill, the federally mandated procedures will 
depend on the nature and weight of the state interests, as 
well as the individual interests, that are asserted. To iden-
tify the nature and scope of state interests that are to be bal-
anced against an individual's liberty interests, this Court may 
look to state law. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 148 
and n. 42, 151 and nn. 48-50 (1973); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S. 651, 661-663 (1977). Here we view the underlying 
state law predicate for weighing asserted state interests as 
being put into doubt, if not altered, by Roe Ill. 24 
23 Even prior to Roe III, the Court of Appeals concluded that Massachu-
setts state law, which it construed as requiring judicial determinations of 
incompetency separate from involuntary commitment proceedings, see 634 
F. 2d, at 658-659, ''in many respects ... goes well beyond the minimum 
requirements mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment," id., at 659 (foot-
note omitted). Roe III now has taken the further step of requiring judi-
cial procedure in every instance in which a guardian believes drug therapy 
necessary for a noninstitutionalized incompetent. 
"'In Roe III the Massachusetts court explicitly considered the implicated 
state interests, see- Mass., at-, 420 N. E. 2d, at 59, and concluded 
that the trial judge had erred in finding that the State had a "vital" parens 
patriae interest in "seeing that its residents function at the maximum level 
',. 
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See Youngberg v. Romeo, 
ante, at 12-13; 
The principal question on which we ·granted certiorari is 
whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic 
drugs. 14 This question has both substantive and procedural 
aspects. See 634 F. 2d, at 656, 661; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 
2d 836, 841 (CA3 1980). The parties agree that the Constitu-
tion recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 15 Assuming that 
they are correct in this respect, the substantive issue in-
volves a definition of that protected constitutional interest, as 
well as identification of the conditions under which com etin 
state interests might outweigh it. Bell v. Wol , 441 
U. S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 147-154 
(1973); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 
25--27(1905). The procedural issue concerns the minimum 
procedures required by the Constitution for determining that 
the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a 
particular instance. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 606 
(1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). 
As a practical matter both the substantive and procedural 
issues are intertwined with questions of state law. In the-
ory a court might be able to define the scope of a patient's 
cases, including Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (CA3 1980), and Davis v. 
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ohio 1980). On the issues raised, see gen-
erally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Con-
trol: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 237 (1974). 
14 Pet. 1. 
16 In this Court petitioners appear to concede that involuntarily commit-
ted mental patients have a constitutional interest in freedom from bodily 
invasion, see Brief for Petitioners at 43-47, but they deny that this interest 
is "fundamental." They also assert that it is outweighed in an appropriate 
balancing test by compelling state interests in administering antipsychotic 
drugs. ld., at 54--68. 
lfp/ss 06/17/82 80-1417 Mills v. Rogers 
We granted certiorari in this casJ'to decide important 
issues concerning the rights of mental patients~to refuse 
treatment with anti-psychotic drugs. 
The federal constitutional question,lare intertwined 
with questions of state law. After we granted certiorar~ 
the highest court of Massachusetts--the State 
in which the parties reside--decided a case involving 
similar issues. 
As a result of this intervening decision, it now 
appears that Massachusetts state la~ay have changed in 
ways affecting the.claim~of the parties in th~
Under these c1rcumstances ylwe conclude thatAwe should 
not - at this time - undertake to render a constitutional 
judgment. We therefore vacate the decision of the Court of 
Appeals~and remand the case for reconsideration in light of 
the intervening de~~ 
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